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FOREWORD
Long-standing public programs, many dating back to the
1930s, are coming under increasing strain and scrutiny.
Those dealing with the problems of unemployed workers are
prominent among them. Minor modifications and additions
may not be enough to achieve the extent of reform needed to
make existing programs viable in our contemporary setting.
Saul Blaustein's proposed regrouping of unemployment in
surance and related programs designed to deal with the needs
of unemployed workers represents the reasoned type of
reform worth considering.
The W.E. Upjohn Institute is pleased to publish this
monograph by one of its staff researchers not only because
of the fresh approach it describes, but also because it ad
dresses a continuing and persistent dilemma of our
times the waste of human resources resulting from
unemployment. In drawing together diverse programs of in
come support and employment services around the central
goal of reemployment, the proposed scheme restores a focus
that has become at least partially neglected over the years.
The suggested restructuring of our present unemployment
insurance program and establishment of a new unemploy
ment assistance program represent major departures from
current approaches, and the strong emphasis on reemploy
ment efforts makes the whole scheme responsive to the grow
ing sentiment that the problem often calls for more than in
come support. Mr. Blaustein's long experience in research
and analysis of unemployment insurance and related matters
lends authority to his ideas and makes them deserving of
serious consideration.

Facts and observations presented in this monograph are
the sole responsibility of the author, and do not necessarily
represent positions of the W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research.
E. Earl Wright
Director

Kalamazoo, Michigan
June 1981
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PREFACE
Many of the ideas assembled in this monograph draw
upon thinking and discussion extending back over a period
of 25 years involving numerous colleagues and others in the
fields of unemployment insurance, employment and train
ing, and welfare. The initial opportunity to bring these ideas
together within the concept of a new integrated system came
in 1976 when the Michigan Department of Labor's Bureau
of Employment and Training requested some alternative ap
proaches for the state's unemployment insurance program.
The result was a report made in 1977 entitled A New Job
Security System for Michigan.
The preface to that earlier report set forth the following as
the guiding point of view:
A fundamental consideration in developing pro
gram alternatives has been to place unemployment
insurance in a total context of government policy
and action for helping the unemployed. In giving
effect to that orientation, a major assumption is
made that the basic focus of whatever assistance
that is supplied to the unemployed must be on mov
ing them into productive employment and a posi
tion of self support. It was important, therefore, to
consider carefully the total context and suggest how
it could more effectively center on that assumption.
That same thought applies equally in the present
monograph.
In the reformulation, the Job Security System is placed in
a national orientation thereby overcoming a number of
Vll

dilemmas when viewed on a state basis only. The System and
its principal components receive further and fuller develop
ment as well. The intent is to stimulate debate and other new
ways of thinking about the continuing problems of
unemployment and the means for dealing with them.
Of the many individuals who encouraged me and com
mented very helpfully on this work, I feel moved to single
out a few who perhaps can stand for all who did so. These in
clude Ralph Altman, Father Joseph M. Becker, Jerry
Beideman, Philip Booth, Raymond Munts, William Papier,
George F. Rohrlich, and David W. Stevens. I am also
grateful to Wilbur J. Cohen who invited me to present some
of these ideas, particularly with respect to unemployment in
surance, to the National Commission on Unemployment
Compensation. That presentation yielded further useful
comments and was summarized as "A Proposal for a New
Job Security System With Three Tiers of Unemployment In
surance" in Volume 1 of Unemployment Compensation
Studies and Research accompanying the Commission's Final
Report, July 1980.
Finally, I must acknowledge the diligence and patience of
the supporting staff at the Upjohn Institute in seeing the
monograph through many drafts to its final form. Any re
maining shortcomings are my responsibility alone.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"I'm mighty glad to get this check, but getting
back on the job is even better."
Niels R. Ruud
"We have started to pay unemployment benefits
in Wisconsin. . . . but let's not forget that steady
work and wages will always be better than
unemployment benefits."
Paul Raushenbush
These two statements were made July 1, 1936 in Madison,
Wisconsin on the occasion of the first unemployment in
surance benefit payment ever made in the United States. 1 In
his terse remark, the recipient expressed perfectly the ap
propriate perspective about the benefit payment. The
response by Mr. Raushenbush, the first and long-time direc
tor of the Wisconsin program and one of the "fathers" of
unemployment insurance in this country, underscored the
joint objectives of income support and reemployment. In
both statements, the emphasis on the latter is clear.
This monograph describes a new framework, called the
Job Security System, 2 which would integrate the various
1. American Labor Legislation Review, September 1936, p. 102.
2. This title is used to distinguish the proposed system from the present federal-state system
made up of state employment security agencies operating unemployment insurance and
employment service programs.
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public programs designed to help experienced unemployed
workers find work and to alleviate their unemployment. The
scheme's main purpose is to organize these programs
systematically and cohesively and focus them on the goal of
employment. Its core objective is getting unemployed
workers into suitable jobs. No one served by the proposed
system is outside the labor force; each is capable of working
and available for work. The presumption is that everyone
who applies for help in finding work or for income
maintenance during unemployment wants a job and is seek
ing one.
By and large, clients of the Job Security System are
unemployed workers with established labor force attach
ment. New entrants and reentrants to the labor force may
also be served, but they are likely to be aided more directly
by programs provided under the Comprehensive Employ
ment and Training Act (GETA), especially if there is a prob
lem of low income and a lack of skills or work experience.
The CETA programs are outside the proposed system. The
Job Security System and CETA programs, however, must
coordinate their services to assure that no one seeking
employment who can be helped is neglected.
Besides job search assistance and other employment ser
vices, the Job Security System (JSS) provides income sup
port consisting, for the most part, of two types of wage-loss
compensation: unemployment insurance (UI) and a new pro
gram of unemployment assistance (UA). UI is available as a
matter of right to covered unemployed workers who meet
certain employment-related conditions, such as past and cur
rent labor force attachment. UA would be available to the
noninsured unemployed those who exhaust UI benefits or
are not covered by UI who meet similar conditions plus an
income test. In addition, the system would administer a
number of special programs that supplement UI for certain
categories of unemployed workers, such as trade adjustment
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assistance for workers adversely affected by foreign imports.
The system may also pay cash benefits or allowances in con
nection with specific adjustment activities, such as retraining
and relocation, when undertaken by unemployed workers.
The JSS deals with the unemployed as individuals and
with individual employers who want workers. It does not, as
such, treat the general problem of unemployment, of general
insufficiency in the demand for labor. That is the concern of
fiscal, monetary, and other economic policies. The proposed
system's main thrust is to guide the unemployed labor supply
to the jobs available and, to the extent it can, to help bring
about the most efficient employment of the labor supply. In
the process, the system would constantly update and im
prove its knowledge of the labor market to identify jobs
which are available and employers who are likely to need
workers.
The expectation is that nearly all unemployed workers
assisted by the system will become reemployed within a
reasonable period of time, most within a few months. It
must be emphasized, however, that this expectation can be
realized only if the economy is in good health and generates a
strong demand for labor. If labor demand is weak, the
number of jobless workers will increase, as will the average
duration of their unemployment, and the system will be less
successful in achieving its goal despite its best efforts on
behalf of clients. The value and effectiveness of the JSS will
be most evident when there are jobs to be filled.

Justification for the New System
Many public programs now exist for aiding the
unemployed. They include the state employment or job ser
vices and various CETA programs operated by local govern
ment units and by states. These programs offer job search
and related employment services, vocational training, other
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vocational adjustment services, and temporary public service
employment. 3 Other public programs provide various forms
of income support for the unemployed. These include
unemployment insurance, welfare payments through the
federally subsidized Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC)-Unemployed Father program, 4 disaster
unemployment assistance, a growing number of special pro
grams aimed at compensating workers for job loss resulting
from certain government policies, 5 and limited local or state
general assistance that may be available for needy persons,
including some who are unemployed. 6 Some federal pro
grams provide other forms of financial assistance for the
unemployed, such as food stamps, Medicaid, and housing
subsidies; these are also available to persons who are not in
the labor force. Some of the unemployed who are in public
training programs may receive training allowances. 7
These programs began and evolved over the past 50 years,
many of them within the last 20 years. Since problems of the
unemployed are varied and numerous, it is not surprising
that the measures devised to help overcome these problems
are also varied and numerous. Taken together, the public
programs available represent an extensive set of policies
3. At the time of writing (early 1981), the public service employment programs under
CETA are being curtailed and scheduled to terminate by October 1981.
4. The standard AFDC program may also be included in this listing since some adult reci
pients must register for work with the public employment service and be available for work.
Not all AFDC recipients, however, are required to do so, such as those caring for small
children or for family members who are sick or disabled.
5. These include, among others, Trade Adjustment Assistance (as provided under the
Trade Act of 1974), the Redwood Employee Protection Program, two Railroad Employee
Protection Programs, Urban Mass Transportation Protection, and the Airline Employee
Protection Program.
6. The railroad UI program is not part of the present federal-state system and remains out
side the proposed new system. Ideally, and eventually, it too should be included.
7. Other public income maintenance programs, such as social security-old age insurance,
also supply support for the unemployed although that is not their particular objective. See
Merrill G. Murray, Income for the Unemployed: The Variety and Fragmentation of Pro
grams, (Kalamazoo, MI: The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, April
1971), p. 70.
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ministering to the needs of unemployed persons. It is fair to
ask, then, what the proposed new system can add. Why is it
desirable to establish another or a different approach in an
area already addressed by so many approaches? What does
the proposed system offer that is different and significantly
better than what present arrangements provide?
The Job Security System is designed not so much as a new
additional approach for aiding the unemployed, but rather
as a means for pulling existing programs together into a
more coherent, integrated, and coordinated set of activities.
Many of the existing programs developed at different times
to meet specific needs without taking sufficient account of
other programs already in place which served similar pur
poses. A new program may have emerged because an existing
program did not serve a particular need adequately or as
precisely as desired, and because it often was easier to create
a separate approach than try to adapt or improve a larger
established program. There has been, for example, a pro
liferation of special programs (see footnote 5) aimed at
specific industries or groups of workers who are dislocated
because of a public policy, such as tariff reduction
agreements with other countries, or deregulation of a par
ticular industry. These programs single out limited groups of
workers for special treatment usually more generous than
that provided by the more general programs. 8
Another kind of development has been the partial redirec
tion of an existing program to serve purposes it was not
originally intended or designed to serve. The use of
unemployment insurance, for example, to compensate for
very long term unemployment during 1975-1977 (up to 65
weeks in some cases) went far beyond that program's
8. For a description and discussion of these programs, see Mamoru Ishikawa, Unemploy
ment Insurance and Proliferation of Other Income Protection Programs for Experienced
Workers, Unemployment Insurance Occasional Paper 80-1 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Unemployment In
surance Service, 1980).
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original conception. The increased refocusing of the AFDC
program on availability for work or training for many of its
adult recipients is another example of a significant change in
direction that places strains on a program's conceptual base
and structure.
The motivations for these new developments have usually
been quite reasonable and sound, and the approaches taken
may also have been reasonable and sound up to a point. As
new developments accumulate over time, however, without
adequate coordination, confusions and inefficiencies multip
ly. Both duplications and gaps in services and support for the
unemployed may develop. There may be unequal treatment
of the unemployed without justification that is apparent to
recipients. Administrative responsibilities are fragmented.
Programs may conflict or work at cross purposes, and
tendencies develop to lose sight of intended goals. Ad
ministrative difficulties increase and funds may be wasted.
Both those who pay for the costs of these services and those
who receive them have reason to complain. When such con
ditions accumulate to major proportions, it is time to con
sider consolidation and reform. The Job Security System is
proposed as a means for such consolidation and reform.
The new system would also provide an opportunity to
establish a common and consistent conceptual base for these
programs, and that may be its most important justification.
Too often, programs have narrow objectives and fail to take
account of broader or more primary goals. More adequate
income support for unemployed workers is an important
purpose sought by some of the new special programs, but
overconcentration on that objective can diminish emphasis
on assisting the process of reemployment. To a large extent,
the failure to pursue the latter goal more vigorously is a
problem of administrative priorities and inadequate financ
ing rather than statutory intent. The UI program has always
required claimants to be available for work and to seek
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work, and looks to the employment service (ES) to assure
their exposure to jobs. The ES, however, is continually
diverted to place higher priorities on serving groups other
than UI claimants, thereby reducing the reemployment em
phasis for the latter. Moreover, the ES staff nationally has
remained fixed in size for 15 years despite its heavier respon
sibilities, which effectively bars any significant im
provements in its services. The proposed JSS builds em
phasis on the reemployment objective directly into its pro
cedures so that it cannot be neglected so easily.
To repeat the point made at the outset, it is the premise of
the new system that suitable reemployment is its core objec
tive. Income support is a vital factor, but it should not over
shadow the ultimate goal of employment; it should be ad
ministered so as to support that goal as well as to alleviate
hardship. The fact, for example, that recipients of AFDC or
of state and local general assistance include both labor force
participants and nonparticipants makes those programs illsuited to pursue the employment objective for the former.
The Job Security System alters the income support ar
rangements for labor force participants now under these pro
grams to correct for that deficiency.
Failure to pursue the employment objective vigorously has
contributed to general public criticism of income
maintenance programs. Much of the public regards these
programs as too generous and too easily available to too
many individuals who are suspected of being unavailable for
work or unwilling to work, despite what they claim openly.
Whether or not such criticism is fully justified, the lack of
emphasis on reemployment assistance helps to convey and
sustain the impression held. The proposed system offers the
opportunity to reestablish the primacy of employment and
thereby respond to public concerns over income maintenance
programs.
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Another supporting argument for the proposed system is
that it may open the way to resolve some problems in several
existing programs that appear to have become intractable.
By incorporating these existing programs within the system
and integrating them around the central orientation of
employment assistance, some restructuring and im
provements can be made which may resolve their problems
more readily than possible within their current contexts.
The public employment services, for example, require
revitalization and strengthening. Their active integration
with UI and other income assistance within the JSS stresses
the reemployment goal for recipients and restores the
employment service to the major role contemplated for it
earlier but which has become increasingly remote over the
years. Employment service financing requires reform and ex
pansion which may have a better chance under the JSS
design.
The federal-state UI program currently faces serious prob
lems which appear very difficult to resolve within its pres
ent structure, at least in a way that would attract broad
agreement. Under the proposed JSS, the UI program would
be restructured to emphasize close integration with
reemployment assistance. The new structure also offers a
way of treating two major problems that bedevil the present
program the duration of UI protection and financial in
solvency.
The establishment of a new unemployment assistance pro
gram within the proposed new system seeks to rationalize the
treatment of some AFDC recipients as labor force par
ticipants and to close the gaps that exist in the support of
other needy unemployed persons. Welfare reform proposals
continue to mix welfare and employment assistance without
adequate distinctions among recipients so that the latter can
be applied effectively. The incorporation of UA within the
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JSS would make that distinction clear. Welfare reform could
then deal more readily with those AFDC recipients who can
not work or are not expected to work.
General Design
The JSS proposal calls for a comprehensive and integrated
system that provides various employment assistance services
and income support to unemployed workers, and to some
underemployed workers as well. The system combines,
restructures, and improves upon present employment and in
come support programs to assure closer coordination among
them, greater efficiency of their operations, and more com
plete coverage of the needs of the unemployed. It assumes
that private sector activity and public economic policies will
keep overall unemployment levels within manageable
bounds; the system's services and support are likely to prove
inadequate and ineffective under conditions of prolonged
mass unemployment no matter how well organized and in
tegrated they are. 9
At all times, the Job Security System emphasizes employ
ment promotion efforts to help jobseekers find satisfactory
work. Income support is viewed as a temporary measure
available only when reasonable employment is not available
and while jobseeking efforts proceed. Income support is im
portant to the unemployed, but its provision must not
obscure the focus on promotion of reemployment. If
unemployment continues for a very long period, particularly
under generally normal labor market conditions, the in
dividual's employability may require reevaluation. The
possibility must be considered that the very long term jobless
worker may in fact be unemployable. That individual might
9. One hesitates to specify a particular limit above which unemployment would be con
sidered unmanageable, but the peak unemployment rates experienced in the 1975 recession
period would surely qualify as such if continued for very long.
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be offered a place in a sheltered workshop program or
shifted to the Supplemental Security Income program cur
rently available for the disabled and the aged who need such
support.
While the proposed JSS is national in scope, it is designed
to operate essentially through state-administered programs.
State UI and job services would continue, but subject to
some modifications or adaptations required by restructuring
under the new system. Federal and state governments would
continue as partners in the system, but the balance of respon
sibility and control would shift more towards a national
orientation with regard to the problem of long term
unemployment. The shift reflects a recognition that when
unemployment becomes increasingly prolonged for in
dividual workers, the means required to support them and to
resolve their problems may lie increasingly beyond the
capacities of local and state resources.
Central to the Job Security System is the registration of
jobseekers for work and the listing of as many job openings
as possible at the public employment or job security offices.
The key is the establishment of a genuine, fully-functioning
labor exchange. With some exceptions, registration would be
compulsory for all those seeking income support and
employment assistance provided under the system.
Jobseekers would be diagnosed and classified according to
their need for job search assistance. Assistance could range
from simply providing access to a listing of job openings to
planning and facilitating substantial training or rehabilita
tion. Where a job is not immediately available, the
unemployed worker may draw income support if eligible.
Following initial diagnosis, the system would provide for
further review, at appropriate times, of the registrant's job
search activities and reassessment of need for help if
unemployment continues. The advice and assistance sup
plied would then change accordingly.
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Since most subsidized public service employment and
training for the unemployed are now organized and ad
ministered through decentralized CETA programs, the Job
Security System must coordinate its activities closely with
these programs. How best to achieve the proper coordina
tion between CETA and the public employment service is
currently an uncertain and controversial matter. No attempt
is made here to deal with the question. Evaluation of CETAemployment service relations should be pressed to illuminate
the problems. Their resolution should aim at serving the best
interests of jobseekers and employers. Through improved
collection and analysis of labor market information, the JSS
would continuously monitor the need for employability
development services, training, and public service employ
ment for its clients. Such information and analysis also form
an important base for planning CETA programs. Because
eligibility rules exclude many unemployed workers from
CETA programs, the JSS should have the flexibility of pro
viding similar types of services to such workers when the
need is indicated.
Income support supplied through the Job Security System
is identified clearly as support for labor force participants.
Income support for nonparticipants should be supplied out
side this system. Some of the present welfare programs mix
the two. These should be redesigned so that labor force par
ticipants now serviced through welfare programs would
receive their support through the JSS. A major innovation
proposed with JSS is the establishment of a new unemploy
ment assistance program to supply income support to needy
unemployed jobseekers who are not eligible to receive
unemployment insurance. Unemployment assistance would
replace present welfare support for those who are able to
work and expected to seek employment and who have some
work experience. Like unemployment insurance, UA would
be available as a weekly benefit.

12
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Under the proposed system, unemployment insurance is
restructured as a three-tiered program to cover short,
medium, and long term unemployment, and to limit its total
scope to the first 39 weeks of unemployment. The full extent
of UI protection would be available to eligible unemployed
workers at all times; the payment of long term benefits
would not depend on the rate of unemployment. Any sup
port beyond the UI limit would be supplied through the
unemployment assistance program. The new arrangement
eliminates special extensions of unemployment benefits dur
ing recession periods. Each UI tier has its own eligibility re
quirements and job search conditions. The proposed method
of financing UI benefit costs is geared to the three-tiered ar
rangement.
The Job Security System, as proposed, also encompasses
other forms of support and employment assistance, such as
training allowance supplements, relocation assistance, and
other rehabilitation measures.
The proposed system takes account of the varied composi
tion of the unemployed as analyzed in terms of certain
characteristics that are relevant to distinguishing job search
service and income support needs. In describing the plan,
this monograph proceeds first with an analysis of the
system's potential clientele in terms of some of these
characteristics. It then discusses the types of services and in
come support provided under the system for each clientele
category. The type of services and support available, and the
manner in which they are supplied, may vary at different
stages of an individual's unemployment or with the condi
tion of the relevant labor market. These distinctions are im
portant and also noted. Following this presentation of what
the system offers for different categories of the unemployed,
each type of proposed service or income support is more ful
ly described with regard to content and financing, with par
ticular emphasis on explaining changes from existing ar-
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rangements, the reasons for the changes, and some opposing
arguments.
Recently, the National Commission on Unemployment
Compensation (NCUC) completed a two and one-half year
study of the federal-state UI program and related
problems. 10 Many of the concerns of the Commission
overlap those addressed by the JSS proposal. Where ap
propriate, NCUC recommendations will be indicated and
discussed in this monograph.
10. Unemployment Compensation: Final Report, National Commission on Unemployment
Compensation, Washington, DC, July 1980.

II. POTENTIAL CLIENTELE
OF THE JOB SECURITY SYSTEM
Table 1 analyzes the unemployed labor force by sex-age
categories and by reasons for unemployment. The latter con
cern whether or not the unemployed had been working just
prior to their unemployment and, among those who had, the
nature of their job separation. Data are shown for 1975 and
1979 to compare a recession year with a year of lower
unemployment. Not only is the total level of unemployment
different between the two years, but the distributions by
reasons for unemployment are also different. In 1975, for
example, workers on layoff and job losers together compris
ed over half (55 percent) of the unemployed compared with
43 percent in 1979. These unemployed workers account for
most of the insured unemployed; in 1975 and 1979, insured
unemployment made up about 63 and 44 percent, respective
ly, of all unemployment. 1
The data in the table represent annual average levels of
unemployment for each year. The total number of persons
experiencing unemployment at any time during the year is
much larger. It was 21.1 million in 1975 and 17.9 million in
1979. 2 Information available about all persons experiencing
unemployment during the year does not permit their analysis
by reasons for unemployment. Their numbers, however, af1. Based on data in Economic Indicators, March 1980, p. 13.
2. Data from Employment and Training Report of the President, 1980, p. 303, and from
News from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, September 18, 1980.
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Table 1
Potential Unemployed Clientele of Proposed Job Security System by Reason for Unemployment, Sex and Age
Annual Averages, 1975 and 1979
1979
1975
Age 20 and over
Age 20 and over
Age 16
Age 16
Reason for
to 19
Female
Male
Total
to 19
Female
Total
Male
unemployment

Potential
0

All unemployed
Thousands
Percent

7,830
100.0

3,428
100.0

2,649
100.0

1,752
100.0

5,963
100.0

2,223
100.0

2,213
100.0

1,528
100.0

Previously employed
On temporary layoff
Job losers
Job leavers

65.8
21.2
34.2
10.4

83.5
28.8
46.2
8.5

63.9
20.5
29.5
13.9

34.3
7.6
18.0
8.7

57.1
14.0
28.8
14.3

77.7
20.8
42.8
14.1

53.6
13.1
24.2
16.3

32.3
5.4
15.1
11.8

Not previously employed
Reentrants
New entrants

34.2
23.8
10.4

16.5
14.5
2.1

36.1
31.9
4.2

65.7
29.9
35.8

42.9
29.5
13.4

22.3
19.3
3.0

46.3
40.0
6.3

67.6
29.0
38.6

SOURCE: Employment and Earnings, January 1977, p. 147, and January 1980, p. 168.
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ford some idea of the volume of potential clients of the Job
Security System. 3
Most of the unemployed were working just prior to their
unemployment 66 percent in 1975 and 57 percent in 1979.
Reentrants and new entrants into the labor force constitute
the rest of the unemployed. Of this category, about four out
of five were women or teenagers, in both years.
The following discussion elaborates further on the com
position of each category of unemployed individuals, there
by providing some background in preparation for the later
description of the services that would be supplied by the Job
Security System.

Unemployed Workers—Previously Employed
These are workers who have temporarily or permanently
separated from their jobs. They can be divided into three
groups on the basis of the temporary or permanent nature of
the separation and whether the permanent separation was
voluntary or involuntary.

Workers on temporary layoff
This group consists of workers who are placed on tem
porary layoff with expectation of recall. They remain attach
ed to their jobs though not on the active payroll. Certain jobconnected fringe benefits may continue for these workers.
The group subdivides further on the basis of the expected
length of the layoff or the degree of assurance of recall, fac
tors that are not always clear or definite. For various pur
poses, it is useful to distinguish between workers on a
specific short term or limited term layoff, say for no more
3. Over 11 million workers began drawing UI benefits in 1975 and over 8 million in 1979
(from Handbook of Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, U.S. Department of Labor,
Employment and Training Administration).

18

Potential Clientele

than 30, 60, or 90 days, and those on a longer or indefinite
layoff. The indefinite layoff can turn out to be long term or
permanent; at some point it is advisable for such an in
dividual to pursue prospects for alternative employment.
Most workers on short term layoffs do not actively seek
other jobs.
About 55 to 60 percent of this group consist of adult men
and about a third or more, adult women; the small re
mainder are teenagers. The proportion of the unemployed
who are on temporary layoff is substantially higher during
recession periods. Nearly all of them are eligible to draw UI
benefits.

Job losers
These are workers who have been separated from their
jobs involuntarily. They divide into the following three
subgroups with varying implications for income support
eligibility:
Workers discharged because of misconduct;
Workers retired compulsorily from their jobs;
All other involuntary job losers.
Regardless of the reason for job loss, unemployed workers in
these subgroups are considered able to work, available for
work, and in an active search for work. Workers fired for
misconduct are disqualified from drawing UI, at least for a
period of time.
Unemployed retirees may receive pensions, but they still
want and seek work. Normally, they qualify for UI benefits.
In some cases, the strength of their continued attachment to
the labor force comes under question. The pension received
may be deducted from their UI benefits, leaving reduced
weekly benefits or none at all. 4
4. A federal provision requires the states to deduct certain pensions drawn by claimants, in
cluding social security pensions, from their UI benefits.
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Most other job losers are eligible to draw UI. Adult men
make up about 55 to 60 percent of all job losers, adult
women account for about 30 percent, and the rest are
teenagers.

Job leavers
These workers have resigned or quit their jobs voluntarily.
As unemployed, they are assumed to be available for and
seeking work. They are not eligible to draw UI, at least for a
period of time, unless they left for a good cause that is ac
ceptable for UI purposes.
In some cases, the distinction between a job leaver and a
job loser is not absolutely clear. The reason for the separa
tion, or whether there was "good cause" for leaving, may be
disputed between the worker and the former employer. On
the one hand, the worker may feel that the employer exerted
great pressures, subtle or not so subtle, to force a quit, in
which case the separation was tantamount to a discharge. On
the other hand, the worker may really want to leave but ar
ranges to be fired, or induces the employer to do so, to avoid
a voluntary-quit disqualification for UI benefits. The prob
lem of making the appropriate distinction affects UI eligibili
ty more than it does the administration of job services.
The proportion of the unemployed who are voluntary job
leavers declines in recessions. It was about 10 percent in 1975
compared with 14 percent in 1979. In 1975 and 1979, over 35
percent of all job leavers were adult men and over 45 percent
were adult women; the remainder, about 20 percent, were
teenagers.

Unemployed Persons Not Previously Employed
This category consists of people who have never worked
before (new entrants) or who left the labor force for a time
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after the last job they held (reentrants). Reentrants are the
more sizable group, over twice as numerous as new entrants.

Reentrants
This group reflects a wide range of circumstances, varying
by how long the individual was out of the labor force;
whether the last job was regular or temporary, intermittent,
or part-time; and whether the reentrant currently seeks a
regular permanent job or a temporary one.
Among reentrants in 1975 and 1979, about 45 and 50 per
cent, respectively, were adult women; the rest were split
about evenly between adult men and teenagers.
One important distinction that should be made is between
those who had some employment during the year preceding
reentrance (or during a base period as defined for unemploy
ment insurance purposes) and those who did not. Among
reentrants who did work recently, those who lost their jobs
before they left the labor force may be eligible for UI
benefits when they return to seek work.
New entrants
Strictly speaking, this group represents people who never
worked before; they are seeking their first jobs. Most are
youths who are still in school, or who have just finished or
left school. About 75 percent of all new entrants in both 1975
and 1979 were teenagers. Of the remainder, the majority
were adult women.
It is useful to distinguish between new entrants seeking
temporary or short term employment and others looking for
regular jobs with expectations of long term labor force at
tachment. An individual who has worked before but only on
temporary or short-time jobs for limited periods and who
was not a regular labor force participant may at some point
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become interested in regular, permanent employment. While
classified as a reentrant, that person is, in effect, a new en
trant into the regular labor force. 5 The administration of job
services must take account of these circumstances.

Underemployed Workers
While most clients of the Job Security System are likely to
be totally unemployed persons, others who are currently
employed may also apply and qualify for services. Some
work part time but want full-time jobs. Others in full-time
jobs may feel they are working below their abilities and skills
and seek better jobs. Some in temporary or seasonal jobs
which will soon end seek other employment before job
separation occurs. These groups together comprise what may
loosely be called the underemployed. Consistent with its goal
of promoting the most economically efficient use of our
labor resources, the JSS would provide assistance to these
workers in finding full employment.
The number of underemployed workers who seek or want
full-time or better jobs is difficult to pin down. Information
exists about workers employed part time (less than 35 hours
per week) from the monthly Current Population Survey, the
source of much of our labor force statistics. In 1980, an
average of nearly 23 million persons worked part time during
the weeks surveyed. 6 About 10.7 million of them did not
want or were unable to work at full-time jobs. Another 8.0
million worked less than 35 hours a week because of time lost
due to illness, vacation, holidays, bad weather, and other
noneconomic reasons, or because the job was normally
scheduled for less than 35 hours a week. The remaining 4.2
million worked part time for economic reasons. Over half of
5. As defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, new entrants include persons who were
previously employed only part time or who worked full time for less than 2 weeks.
6. Data from Employment and Earnings, January 1981, pp. 190-191.
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these workers were on short-time due to "slack work," and
most usually worked full time. Most who usually worked
part time did so because they could only find part-time work.
Of the nearly 4 million nonagricultural workers employed
part time for economic reasons, 54 percent had jobs in the
trade and service industries, 47 percent were less than 25
years old and 53 percent were female.
A survey conducted in May 1976 identified 3.3 million ful
ly employed workers who were seeking other jobs for the
following reasons: 7
Higher wages or salaries .................. 34 percent
Better hours or working conditions ......... 11 percent
Better advancement opportunities .......... 10 percent
Current job ending, including temporary
or seasonal job ........................ 11 percent

Better use of skills ....................... 9 percent
Other reasons ........................... 25 percent
Some of these workers could also be classified as
underemployed.
As potential clients of the JSS, underemployed workers do
not include those who, as a matter of choice, work on a parttime or temporary basis or at levels below their capacities.
Among involuntarily underemployed workers who might
turn to the JSS for assistance, it is useful to determine
whether their current underemployment is the result of a
temporary reduction of the usual work schedule or a perma
nent characteristic of the job itself.

Workers on temporarily reduced work schedules
This group is similar in many respects to workers placed
on temporary layoffs. The latter can be seen as an extreme
7. Monthly Labor Review, March 1977, p. 60.
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case of a temporary cutback in the normal work schedule.
Unless the cut in the workweek is especially deep, the present
unemployment insurance programs in most states provide no
compensation for lost wages even on a partial benefit basis.
If the reduced work schedule is for a short period, the
workers affected are not likely to be seeking other jobs or to
require employment services. The proposed new structure
for UI benefits would include improved partial benefit provi
sions that accommodate work sharing through reduced
schedules.
In 1979, on average, there were over 1.4 million workers
employed part time for economic reasons who usually work
ed full time; in recession year 1975, this group numbered 1.8
million. 8 Included were workers who lost full-time jobs and
took temporary part-time jobs until they could find full-time
work.

Workers seeking other employment
One component of this group consists of workers who ex
pect their current jobs to terminate and who are able to seek
other jobs beforehand. Included are workers on temporary
or seasonal jobs and those already notified that their jobs
will end in the near future. If possible, such workers should
be looking for further employment to avoid or minimize any
subsequent unemployment. It is, however, difficult and
often impossible to do so while still working full time. Job
search services for these workers could be beneficial,
especially if available after working hours.
Other underemployed jobseekers working below their
capabilities seek jobs that better fulfill their potentials. Job
search assistance can serve an upgrading function for such
workers. Some unemployed job leavers may have been
8. Employment and Earnings, January 1980, p. 184, and January 1976, p. 150.
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motivated to quit because they were underemployed in this
sense. To the extent they succeed in finding better employ
ment, the jobs vacated may become available to unemployed
workers with lesser capacities.

This chapter describes how the proposed Job Security
System functions with respect to the unemployed and
underemployed as grouped by the foregoing classifications.
Most of the unemployed will enter a local JSS office to file
for UI benefits or unemployment assistance (UA), or to seek
help in finding work, or both. How they are treated will de
pend on the reasons for their unemployment, how long
unemployment has continued, and the current condition of
the labor market. How and what kind of employment ser
vices are rendered will depend also on the individual's educa
tion, training, job experience, and occupational skills.
The stage of a workers' unemployment is an especially im
portant consideration with regard to the job services and in
come support supplied, as well as to how they are ad
ministered. When the worker draws benefits, the conditions
of eligibility and the type of benefits paid may change as
unemployment becomes more and more prolonged. General
ly speaking, major changes in these respects are assumed to
occur at three-month intervals. This assumption underlies
the proposed reorganization of the present federal-state UI
program into the new three-tiered program.
While admittedly arbitrary, the three-tiered arrangement
would force a deliberate reconsideration of the worker's cir
cumstances and the need for any change in the job search ap
proach being followed. If circumstances warranted, a review
25
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would be made even before the end of the three-month
period. In the past, the UI program has applied the practice
of periodic interviews of claimants, but not consistently or
on a sustained basis. Often, determining the claimant's con
tinuing eligibility for benefits has received much greater em
phasis than determining the claimant's job search needs. Ex
periments in the late 1960s and early 1970s with individual
ized analysis and treatment of the reemployment needs of
claimants encouraged further development of this approach,
but budgetary constraints interfered. The current Eligibility
Review Program has revived those efforts and is working
toward widespread application in all states. 1 How well it suc
ceeds depends heavily on resources allocated to the approach
and on how far state agency officials are willing and able to
push the idea down the line. So far, results appear mixed.
The formal move from one tier to the next under the
restructured UI program would assure that a close review is
made as needed, both for eligibility and job search purposes.
It would impress the thought on both the claimant and the
counselor that a new stage has begun which may call for
some changes in attitude about the strategy and nature of the
job search. Each tier would provide 13 weeks of benefits, but
the eligibility conditions specified for each tier would be dif
ferent and increasingly demanding. The tiers, successively,
would compensate for short term, medium term, and long
term unemployment. Beyond the third tier, income support
would no longer be provided on an insurance basis, but
would be available as unemployment assistance on the basis
of an income text. Chapters V and VI describe in more detail
these two income support programs under the proposed
system.
1. The federal-state UI program is currently pursuing efforts to establish similar procedures
for claimants through its Eligibility Review Program, outlined in General Administration
Letter No. 5-77 issued to all state agencies on December 21, 1976 by the U.S. Department
of Labor's Employment and Training Administration.
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The general level of unemployment and local labor market
conditions would also influence the way job services and in
come support are administered. Unlike the present UI pro
gram, the proposed system would not automatically extend
UI when unemployment reaches specified levels. Labor
market conditions, however, would affect the services and
benefit eligibility requirements, and how they do so is
generally covered in this discussion.
The key individuals of the JSS staff involved directly with
the unemployed worker would be the job search counselor
and the benefit reviewer. In dealing with the UI claimant,
both would work closely together; they would be located in
the same office. A similar team would work with UA
claimants, though perhaps in a different part of the office so
as to keep the two programs distinct.
The counselor must be knowledgeable about current labor
market conditions and job search practices, and about how
different occupations and skills relate to each other so as to
identify a range of jobs that the claimant can reasonably
consider seeking. The counselor must also be aware of the
availability of specialized services, e.g., aptitude testing,
retraining and rehabilitation, to which the claimant can be
referred, if appropriate. The benefit reviewer would apply
the eligibility requirements and see that the claimant
understands them. Both the counselor and the reviewer
together would diagnose and reassess the claimant's job pro
spects at the start of each UI tier and at other times as need
ed. They would also consult together and with the claimant
in developing a job search plan. The benefit reviewer would
monitor the claimant's job search to see how well the plan is
followed or if it needs change. Emphasis is always on en
couragement and assistance to the claimant in finding
employment. The expectation underlying this emphasis is
that the true attitudes of the claimant with regard to desire
and availability for work are more readily revealed in the
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context of a positive approach than in a direct attempt at the
outset to question the claimant's labor force attachment and
behavior.
Unemployed Workers-—Previously Employed

Workers on temporary layoff
All workers on a temporary layoff would be eligible for
first-tier (short term) UI benefits, assuming they meet the
minimum base-period employment and earnings qualifying
requirements for this tier.
If recall to work is scheduled or definitely expected to take
place within 30 days of the layoff, the worker would not
need to register at the employment service or actively seek
other employment during this period to maintain eligibility
for benefits. The worker who wishes to do so may apply for
job search services. If recall is expected after 30 days and
within 90 days, the same conditions prevail. The worker's
recall status, however, should be reconfirmed with the
employer 30 days (or 4 weeks) and again 60 days (8 weeks)
after the layoff.
If recall is not expected within 90 days, or if the layoff is or
becomes indefinite, the worker must register for work and
have a diagnosis made of reemployment prospects as a con
dition for receiving UI. The diagnosis normally would be
made when the worker files for the fourth or fifth week of
benefits. If the labor market involving the individual's type
of work is clearly in a recession, the required diagnosis could
be delayed for several more weeks. If the layoff continues
beyond eight weeks and remains indefinite, a job search plan
would be prepared and implemented. If local labor market
conditions continue unfavorable, however, that step could
be postponed until after tier 1 benefits are exhausted.
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Workers on a temporary layoff who do not qualify for
first tier UI because of insufficient past employment may be
eligible for unemployment assistance, depending on
household income. If job recall prospects are indefinite or
likely to take more than 90 days to materialize, the same
treatment applicable to UI claimants would apply to UA
recipients as well.
Workers on layoff who exhaust their short term (tier 1) UI
and continue to be unemployed would be treated the same as
other job losers who exhaust tier 1.

Job losers—workers discharged for misconduct
Workers who qualify for tier 1 but have been discharged
for misconduct would not be paid UI benefits for a period of
weeks after which, if still unemployed, they could draw their
benefits. At the end of the disqualification period, their job
search experience and job prospects would be reviewed and
any advisable adjustments in job search activity suggested.
That review could occur earlier, during the disqualification
period, at the claimant's request. These claimants should be
urged to take advantage of other job services testing,
counseling, etc. that may be appropriate in view of the cir
cumstances of their discharge. In other respects, they would
be treated in the same way as other job losers who draw UI.
Discharged workers who do not qualify for UI on the basis
of past employment but who do meet UA requirements may
become eligible for UA following a disqualification period.
They would receive similar review and advice regarding their
job search.

Job losers—other involuntarily separated workers
Leaving aside for the moment older workers forced to
retire from their jobs, all other job losers include those laid
off permanently for reasons which do not give rise to benefit
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disqualification. These include separations made because of
business declines or shutdowns; staff reductions by non
profit employers or government in response to budget cuts;
worker dislocations resulting from technological or
organizational changes, plant relocation, or other structural
changes in industry; and discharges of employees because of
unsatisfactory performance on the job. Some business
declines may be temporary or seasonal, and workers laid off
may have good prospects for rehire by their former
employers even though not given a specific assurance of
recall. An indistinct line separates such workers from those
placed on a temporary but indefinite layoff.
Under the proposed system, all job losers in this category
who can satisfy the minimum qualifying requirements would
be entitled to tier 1 UI benefits, provided they also meet all
the usual conditions of availability for work, registration
with the employment service, regular reporting to file claims,
and active search for work. At an early stage (within the first
few weeks of filing), a brief diagnosis of reemployment pro
spects would be made to classify these workers into two
groups: the job ready and the less readily employable
jobseekers.
The job ready. These are workers who have viable skills
and experience that are in demand in the local job market,
and who have reasonable prospects of finding new suitable
jobs in the next 8 to 10 weeks. In some cases, they may
already have located jobs that will start during this period
and therefore may be treated as workers on temporary, short
term layoffs. Others should be urged to use any job search
services or techniques that could be helpful, both within and
outside the public employment office. If job search con
tinues for more than 8 to 10 weeks, the worker's job pro
spects should be reviewed and reevaluated. The worker may
need more intensive job search help, particularly with regard
to search methods, or some supportive counseling if there
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appear to be any personal impediments to the job search. As
appropriate, the worker should be advised to consider
whether job expectations are too high in the light of current
labor market conditions. It may be too early to press for
lower expectations if the worker is still considered "job
ready," but the idea could be suggested at this stage.
Refusal, without good cause, to take a suitable job that is of
fered or to follow up on a referal to such a job would be
grounds for a disqualification from UI benefits. Evidence of
unreasonable restriction on availability for work or inade
quate pursuit of a job would also be grounds for benefit
suspension.
A job-ready worker who exhausts tier 1 benefits could file
and qualify for tier 2. Once beyond the short term range of
the UI program, a more intensive review would be made of
the worker's job prospects, job search, and other service
needs. The worker's situation should be reassessed about
every two months, and more frequently if warranted. A
definite job search plan should be prepared and im
plemented, or an earlier plan reevaluated. Some lowering of
job expectations may be urged at this time and pressed
harder if the job search remains unsuccessful. The approach,
however, should be positive and reasonable in the light of
current conditions of the labor market; there must be no
harassment of the claimant. If the job market outlook is
temporarily bleak, the jobseeker could be encouraged to
consider taking temporary, including part-time, work until
prospects improve, if such employment is available and
feasible. The claimant would not be required to take such
employment while still drawing tier 2 benefits, but could be
increasingly pressed to do so as time goes on.
If unemployment continues beyond the 26th week of
benefits, the worker may file and qualify for tier 3 benefits,
but the conditions would become more demanding. If the
worker continues to be considered "job ready" that is, his
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or her skills and experience are still viable in the labor
market the problem is probably one of a temporary but
prolonged recession. At the time the claimant files for tier 3
benefits, job readiness should be reconfirmed. If not con
firmed, the worker may then be a candidate for vocational
adjustment service (training, etc.) and, in general, treated as
a less readily employable jobseeker. If still job ready but a
victim of recession, the worker can be referred to temporary
jobs, including part-time work, if available, even if such
employment falls outside the usual line of work and
somewhat below the usual earnings experience. The jobs
must be suitable and reasonable in other respects, however.
They may include temporary public service jobs established
during recession periods. Failure to accept such employment
without good cause would disqualify the worker from fur
ther UI.
Job-ready unemployed workers who wish to explore
possibilities for retraining or other adjustments through
public programs should be given every consideration possi
ble. If appropriate training and resources are available, they
should have access to them as long as it is clear that they are
unlikely to become reemployed during the period of the
training and that the training would enhance future
reemployment prospects. It may be reasonable for
unemployed workers to utilize a period of unfavorable
reemployment prospects to improve their job capacity
through training. Such efforts toward upgrading should be
encouraged and supported. While in training, workers may
be eligible to receive training allowances to supplement their
UI or UA benefits.
The less employable jobseeker. These job losers are either
structurally unemployed workers whose skills or experience
are no longer in demand in the local labor market, or
marginal workers with few or no vocational skills or with
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other employability impairments. If eligible, they could
receive UI (or UA if not eligible for UI).
Within the first three weeks of unemployment, the
worker's job prospects and vocational improvement needs
would be diagnosed and evaluated, and appropriate plans
drawn with regard to job search and training or rehabilita
tion. The job search counselor's views of the job outlook
and vocational limitations would be discussed thoroughly
and frankly with the unemployed worker. The counselor
could encourage the worker to consider seeking jobs quite
different from those previously held and to accept lower
wages, if necessary, to get started on a new line of work. If a
training course is available and appropriate, the worker
should be informed of it and encouraged to undertake it. If
some other type of rehabilitative measure seems indicated,
such as relocation or even some medical therapy to reduce a
handicap, that too should be suggested, along with informa
tion about the assistance available to enable the worker to
take that step. In general, the objective is to give the worker
a clear explanation of the probable employment limitations
so that a realistic view can develop of what to expect and
what course to follow to improve employability.
While on tier 1, the claimant would not have to follow the
counselor's suggestions with regard to broadened job search,
or to undertake suggested training or other adjustment, since
it must be recognized that the counselor's diagnosis is not in
fallible. This policy would apply especially for a worker af
fected by a structural dislocation but who feels that there
may still be some demand for his or her skills and experience.
If, as time goes on, the results of the job search seem indeed
to confirm the negative outlook, then the worker should be
pressed harder to accept the steps recommended. There
should be close monitoring of the worker's job search activi
ty and perhaps several counseling reviews during the first
three months of unemployment.
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Once beyond tier 1, the unemployed worker who, without
good reason, resists consideration of the suggested ad
justments should be cautioned that such an attitude may
jeopardize eligibility for continued UI protection. If
qualified for tier 2, the worker would be paid these benefits
with the understanding that payment could be suspended in
case of a refusal to accept offers of, or referrals to, different
types of jobs or jobs at lower wages than earned previously.
If an opportunity for appropriate training or some other
rehabilitative measure is refused without good cause after
starting to draw tier 2 benefits, the claimant could be dis
qualified for a period of time. A second disqualification on
these grounds would terminate any further UI benefit rights.
The same conditions would apply during receipt of tier 3 UI
(or of UA).

Job leavers
Workers who voluntarily quit their jobs without good
cause and file for UI or UA benefits would be treated in the
same manner as those who lose their jobs because of miscon
duct. A period of benefit suspension would apply, after
which they could draw benefits if unemployed and otherwise
eligible. They would then be treated about the same as in
voluntarily separated workers, except that the reason for
quitting would be kept in mind for any clues to job search
needs or weak labor force attachment.

Pensioners
Under present federal law, workers may not be forced to
retire from a job before age 70. Most retire earlier in accor
dance with collectively bargained agreements or by in
dividual choice. Some workers who go on a pension file for
UI benefits. Those who retire voluntarily face the same dis
qualification as applies for anyone who voluntarily quits the
job retirement is not "good cause." Retirees normally
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have no difficulty meeting the base-period qualifying re
quirements for UI, but they must also be able to work,
available for work, and actively seeking new employment.
Under the JSS, eligible retirees who are unemployed and
seek work could qualify for and draw tier 1 benefits provided
they meet the current "able and available" conditions.
Federal UI law now requires states to reduce the weekly UI
benefit amount by the prorated weekly amount of any retire
ment pension received by the claimant, including a social
security pension, to which a base-period employer has con
tributed. 2 Most states previously applied a pension reduc
tion, though not for social security. Under the proposed new
UI structure, the states would be left free to apply their own
rules for tier 1 and tier 2. In tier 3, the federal rule would ap
ply.
Because of their age, pensioners may have above-average
difficulty in finding employment, especially employment
that is equivalent or similar to their prior jobs. This factor
should be taken into account in a diagnosis of the claimant's
reemployment prospects and in developing a job search plan,
both to be prepared during the first few weeks of filing. Such
workers should be urged at this early stage to broaden the
range of "suitable" jobs they will seek. Considering the
worker's age and receipt of a retirement pension, genuine at
tachment to the labor force should receive special scrutiny.
Inadequate job search and unreasonable restrictions on
availability for work, including unjustifiably rigid insistence
on defining "suitable work" as only that equivalent to the
prior job and wage level, would be grounds for disqualifica
tion from UI for a specified period.
Following exhaustion of tier 1 benefits, these workers may
qualify for further benefits. The conditions and job services
2. The federal pension reduction requirement allows states to take account of the claim
ant's contributions, if any, to the pension in determining the amount of the reduction.
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applicable would be similar to those described for other job
losers except that, in general, pensioner claimants must be
willing to accept a wider range of jobs, including those pay
ing lower wages, sooner than other job losers. The required
reduction of the weekly benefit amount for pensions receiv
ed, applicable in all states for tier 3, is designed to make
lower-paying jobs more attractive when compared to the
reduced UI benefit.

Unemployed Persons—Not Previously
or Recently Employed
For the most part, this category of the unemployed
presents job search problems that differ from those of
unemployed workers with recent job experience. New en
trants and reentrants to the labor force usually seek work on
their own and rely heavily on the suggestions of relatives and
friends, and most succeed in finding employment this way.
Others make use of specialized services or organizations that
have developed to meet their particular needs. These include,
for example, school vocational and placement offices for
students who have completed their schooling, and agencies
that cater to the job search needs of women who have
devoted their prior years to homemaking and child rearing
and now want paid employment. If low income is a problem,
such jobseekers may qualify for employment and training
services available through local GETA programs. New en
trants and reentrants to the labor force are entitled to register
at the Employment Service and the ES can advise them
where to obtain specialized assistance beyond what it can of
fer itself.

Reentrants
Under JSS, some reentrants may meet the minimum quali
fying requirements for UI on the basis of employment early
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in the base period. If so, it would be necessary to learn about
the circumstances of the last job separation to determine
eligibility for benefits. If the circumstances were disqualify
ing (a voluntary quit or a misconduct discharge, etc.), a
period of benefit suspension would apply. The fact that the
worker had dropped out of the labor force for some time
would call for careful examination of the reasons for
withdrawal and return. If the reentrant is eligible to draw
benefits, the benefit reviewer must be alert to any recurrence
of similar circumstances that may affect the individual's cur
rent availability for work. Apart from these considerations,
reentrants who draw UI would be treated the same as other
job losers. The treatment would also be the same for reen
trants who receive UA instead of UI.
Reentrants who do not qualify for UI or UA may signify
their return to the labor force by registering for work at the
public employment office. As applicants, they would be en
titled to various job services. The type and extent of job
search assistance rendered would take account of such con
siderations as how far back the last employment was;
whether it was permanent, temporary, or intermittent
employment; whether it was full time or part time; and the
type of employment now sought. Apart from need for
assistance, the extent of job service provided would depend
also on the degree to which current attachment seems perma
nent and strong.

New entrants
Job applicants with no prior work experience would not be
eligible for UI or UA, but they would be entitled to job ser
vices. The extent of job services provided would be guided by
the new entrant's reasons for entering the labor force, the
type of work sought, and the temporary or permanent nature
of the individual's current attachment.
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Since most new entrants are teenagers, the job search help
they need is quite special, particularly for those whose educa
tion has been deficient or incomplete, or who suffer from
other kinds of deprivation and discrimination. The extreme
ly high rates of minority youth unemployment in our cities is
well-known and potentially explosive. In the past, the ES has
coped with the job search needs of youth through specialized
counseling and other services. In more recent years, youth
employment and training programs have proliferated within
CETA. Unemployed youths who apply to the JSS for help in
seeking their first jobs, or first regular jobs, would be
directed to those services, whether within JSS or CETA or
elsewhere, that offer the most appropriate course of
assistance.
Underemployed Workers

Workers on temporarily reduced work schedules
Workers placed temporarily on a reduced work schedule
may be eligible for partial UI for a limited period under the
JSS. While drawing partial benefits, they would not be re
quired to register at the employment service or to seek other
full-time employment although they would be entitled to do
so and to have access to appropriate job services if they wish.
If the reduced work schedule continues beyond the period
during which partial benefits are payable, affected workers
should be encouraged to register for full-time employment.
If they decide voluntarily to leave their jobs at this time to
search for full-time work, they would not be disqualified
from UI, since the prolonged reduced work schedule can be
regarded as good cause for quitting. If they are again offered
full-time work by their former employers and they refuse,
without good cause, to return to those jobs, they would be
disqualified from drawing UI benefits.
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Workers seeking other employment
Underemployed full-time workers would not be eligible to
receive any UI or UA. They would, however, be entitled to
register with the employment service and receive all ap
propriate assistance in seeking better jobs. The question may
arise as to whether they are better off quitting their present
jobs so that they can devote more time to seeking new work.
In counseling underemployed workers on this question, great
care should be taken to avoid recommending that they leave
their jobs unless circumstances clearly warrant such action.
The pros and cons of doing so should be thoroughly ex
plored along with new job prospects. Underemployed
workers should also be informed that quitting because of job
dissatisfaction or underemployment could result in a benefit
disqualification, although it may not in all cases. For exam
ple, if an unemployed worker had taken a job less suitable to
his or her skills and experience during a recession while
waiting for better job opportunities to open up in the usual
field of work, that worker should not be disqualified for
quitting to seek such work when prospects improve. Workers
who quit because of underemployment would be allowed to
take advantage of appropriate training or other vocational
adjustment measures that may be available.

IV. EMPLOYMENT SERVICES
How well the JSS responds to the job search needs of its
clients depends on the scope of its employment services and
the care with which they are applied in individual cases. Not
much that is especially new is suggested in the way of par
ticular kinds of services offered. What is new is the greater
concentration of effort to bring the available services to bear
on the individual jobseeker so as to maximize possibilities
for suitable reemployment.
By and large, JSS clients are experienced workers between
jobs. Their unemployment is temporary and expected to be
limited in duration. Most return to employment without the
help of the public employment service, although they
generally must register at the ES if they receive income sup
port.
During the last 15 to 20 years, the ES in most places paid
less attention than previously to the job search needs of UI
claimants, who are experienced workers for the most part.
Early in the 1960s, the ES worked to develop a more in
dependent image for itself as a general manpower agency,
rather than one that served primarily as an adjunct to UI.
Separation of ES from UI took place widely at local levels,
both physically and operationally, making the servicing of
UI claimant needs more difficult and less likely. The Man
power Development and Training Act of that period expand
ed the broader manpower responsibilities of the ES, leading
it further away from the specific needs of UI claimants. As
41
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the 1960s wore on, the consequences of that neglect were not
very apparent, since unemployment declined to very low
levels. The focus shifted to the treatment and elimination of
poverty through training and work experience.
The antipoverty programs of the 1960s created new
responsibilities and priorities for the ES, drawing it more
heavily into dealing with the employment and training needs
of the poor the "disadvantaged" and the unskilled who
had little or unstable work experience, or no work experience
at all. In the process, the ES veered from its goal of serving
as a general manpower agency. The organization and
reorganizations at the federal level of the administration of
manpower policies and programs, and associated planning
and budgeting functions, did not coincide well with state
agency arrangements. Difficulties and confusions resulted at
the local levels, along with tensions between the state and
federal agencies responsible for the ES. Nor were additional
ES responsibilities at the local level matched by sufficient
added resources. The ES, consequently, was unable to carry
on all of its functions satisfactorily and it drew increasing
criticism for its perceived shortcomings.
With the enactment of CETA, the thrust of the 1970s
shifted towards local control and organization of employ
ment and training services independent of the state ES agen
cies. To a great extent, the ES was thereby displaced from
the mainstream of this activity. Lack of coordination bet
ween the ES and CETA agencies became a major problem.
Meanwhile, UI administrators experimented with ways of
their own to identify and provide for the needs of claimants
for job search assistance in the absence of adequate ES atten
tion in this area.
Serious unemployment reappeared in the 1970s, making
more insistent the concerns with UI claimant needs as well as
with benefit eligibility issues. The principal response in re-
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cent years has been the national effort to implement, within
UI operations, the Eligibility Review Program. 1 (This pro
gram's title is misleading since it also is intended to cover
assistance to claimants in their job search.) The ES has had
little or no involvement in this effort.
With regard to the CETA-ES coordination issue, the pro
posed JSS takes the view that the role of the ES should be
more sharply defined as one that deals with the experienced
unemployed, with workers normally employed on a regular
basis but who are temporarily jobless. CETA's concentra
tion is on the inexperienced jobseeker, on the unskilled, on
those with the more severe impediments to employability.
The rationale for distinguishing between these two sets of
clients in this manner is that the type of treatment and ser
vices required are generally different. The distinction is not
always clear-cut; some overlap is inevitable. For the most
part, however, the distinction can be made without much
difficulty. Where overlap does occur, coordination between
ES and CETA remains necessary. Some JSS clients may
benefit by participation in CETA programs and should have
access to them. CETA clients, in turn, may in time gain a
more established position in the labor force so that subse
quent unemployment may bring them under the JSS.
Moreover, ES knowledge of the broader labor market could
be valuable to CETA clients at some time and should be
available to their benefit.
Since experienced unemployed workers are likely to
receive UI, the JSS would restore the ES to its earlier, closer
association with the UI program. Indeed, the coordination
of UI and ES in serving the individual becomes more central
than ever. The various kinds of employment services used to
help bring about the unemployed worker's reemployment
are described separately below. They are, however, to be
1. See footnote 1, ch. III.
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brought together in an appropriate blend for the individual
jobseeker under the direction of the job search counselor.

Placement Services—The Labor Exchange Function
The placement operation of the ES matching jobseekers
and job openings has been seen right along as its central
function and main justification. Each year, ES offices
throughout the country place several millions of workers in
jobs. The quality and scope of placements vary widely. In
some areas, the ES labor exchange function is an important
force in the labor market; in others, it is not. Overall, the ES
accounts for only a limited fraction of all hirings that occur.
That result should not be surprising. Employers are not re
quired to fill their jobs this way, nor are workers compelled
to seek jobs through the ES. The prevailing preference is for
a free labor market. The ES objective is to help make that
market operate more effectively and fairly, not to control it.
A good volume of placement activity is important. The
more job orders the ES can fill, the better does it serve the
unemployed. If the ES demonstrates to employers that it can
supply qualified workers for their labor needs, more
employers will turn to it. Workers will also look to the ES for
jobs if the openings listed are for desirable jobs. Successful
placements can generate increased success on both sides. Too
often, however, the ES refers applicants to job openings
without adequate preparation to be sure that the match is
right and that the job is still open. Employer expectations
can be excessive for the existing labor market. It is important
that the jobs listed offer realistic wages and working condi
tions. Job applicants must also be realistic in their expecta
tions. Close counseling of unemployed workers can go far to
help assure a reasonable outlook.
Another problem that has emerged over the years that af
fects ES-employer relations concerns employer apprehen-
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sions about the enforcement of public policies to promote
equal employment opportunity and affirmative action to
achieve it. The ES has certain responsibilities relating to
these policies with respect to the job orders it takes and the
workers it refers. Application of the rules in a cold,
bureaucratic manner can create employer resentment and
resistance to using the ES. On the other hand, in a positive
and cooperative atmosphere, employers can benefit from
working with the ES to ensure that their hiring practices are
fair and meet equal employment opportunity objectives. In
the final analysis, however, it is the quality of the workers
referred to jobs that determines satisfactory service to
employers.
Mandatory listing of all job openings has been proposed
as a means of strengthening the ES placement function.
Employers who supply goods and services under contract to
the federal government are now required to list all their job
openings with the ES. Little information is available about
the use and effectiveness of such listing. Expanded man
datory listing does not seem desirable unless its value can be
substantiated. A better course would be to attract more job
listings by making more quality placements.
Similarly, not all jobseekers should be required to register
with the ES, and no one proposes such a policy. Of course,
those who receive UI or other public income support general
ly must register, although even here there are exceptions.
Other jobseekers are less likely to apply to the ES for place
ment or other services. More of them should be encouraged
to do so, including workers currently employed but who
believe they are underemployed. Upgrading of the work
force is a legitimate goal of the ES, but one that has been
neglected. Some employers may not appreciate increased
mobility for their workers, and some unions prefer a fairly
fixed or limited labor supply in their trades. Employers in
general, however, would benefit by having more access to ex-
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perienced and better skilled workers. Upward movement of
such workers also creates more opportunity in vacated jobs
for the less experienced and less skilled jobseekers. There is
considerable unfilled demand for certain categories of skilled
workers. 2 The best supply is presently employed workers
who have the desired skills or who can easily develop them.
Thus, upgrading could contribute to productivity improve
ment, a significant current economic goal.
Stress placed on the ES placement function can be over
done. Federal grants to the state agencies to cover their ES
administrative costs emphasize placements in the budget
allocation formula used. The effect is to encourage quantity
rather than quality of placements. Moreover, other impor
tant services that do not necessarily lead to ES placements
and that may be more difficult to account for adequately for
budget purposes may be underfinanced and underemphasized as a result. The budget process should not distort the
blend of services needed to promote reemployment, whether
achieved directly through the agency's placement function or
through some other means. A worker who finds a job on his
own as the result of receiving some counseling and job search
advice should be regarded as much a success for the agency
as is a direct placement. Workers should be encouraged to
look for jobs on their own and not to rely entirely on ES job
listings. Other services are therefore important to broaden
the job search.
Labor Market Information
The ES has the basis for considerable intelligence about
the character and dynamics of local labor markets. State
employment security agencies have detailed data about
2. Even during the 1980 recession, there were serious shortages of skilled workers. See
"Who's Minding the Lathe?", an editorial in the Wall Street Journal, November 28, 1980
concerning the shortage of machinists.
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monthly employment levels by local area, by industry, and
even by individual employer, all available from quarterly
reports employers submit with their UI tax returns. These
reports also indicate the total wages paid out each quarter
and, in most states, list all employees and their quarterly
earnings. UI operations generate data about the weekly
levels of initial claims, indicating new unemployment, and of
continued claims filed, the basis of the insured unemploy
ment count. These data are also available by local area.
Similarly detailed information derives from ES opera
tions the number of active job applicants, listed job open
ings, referrals, placements, etc. Beyond regular operating
data, much more information can be drawn from agency
records about the characteristics of workers, UI claimants,
and job applicants, and their employment and unemploy
ment experience over a period of years. To one degree or
another, the state agencies do collect and analyze such infor
mation. Local labor market analysts exploit the data for
their areas and keep in close touch with events and trends af
fecting employment and wages on the local scene. While not
all the unemployed are reflected in agency records, most of
the experienced unemployed are. Nearly all wage and salary
employment is reflected, since coverage by UI is almost
universal. Local area estimates of total unemployment help
account for the probable size of the noninsured segments.
This rich array of data and its analytical potential makes
the state agency the obvious source of local labor market in
formation. The degree of exploitation of the data varies con
siderably by state and by area, depending on the emphasis
and resources devoted to this activity and the skills of the
analysts. Overall, the data contribute heavily to general
economic analysis and policy planning at national and state
levels. They are key to state and local planning for GETA
programs. Within the context of the primary objectives of
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the JSS, however, the data's importance lies in how they can
help serve the job search needs of individual workers. 3
Much has been done in organizing the available informa
tion in imaginative ways so as to illuminate for jobseekers
and job search counselors what is known about jobs and
working conditions in the local labor market. 4 Unemployed
workers themselves may know a good deal about employ
ment conditions in their particular occupations, especially if
they have worked in recent years for different employers in
the area. Many, however, are not so knowledgeable. Good
labor market information is vital to their job search. It is im
portant that the information be as specific and current as
possible. The task of maintaining adequate intelligence
centers on the local analyst, but other staff can also con
tribute to that effort. Local ES office personnel who deal
directly with employers and jobseekers pick up bits and
pieces of information that can enlarge understanding of cur
rent conditions if brought together with other data. Involved
staff needs to be highly sensitized to the opportunities their
experience affords for improving local labor market infor
mation.
The ways in which labor market information can be
shaped and applied to be of most use to individual
jobseekers have not been adequately explored or developed.
Under the JSS, increased counseling to assist individual job
search would require more development in this area. An im
portant task of the labor market analyst would be to educate
3. For a full description of the data drawn from UI operations and their uses, see "Insured
Unemployment Data" by Saul J. Blaustein in "Data Collection, Processing, and Presenta
tion: National and Local," Appendix, Volume II, to Counting the Labor Force, a report of
the National Commission on Employment and Unemployment Statistics, Washington, DC,
September 1979.
4. An excellent example of possibilities along these lines is the Job Hunter's Guide to
Arizona, Arizona Department of Economic Security, Phoenix, AZ, October 1980. Similar
guides are now available for Hawaii and Nevada.

Employment Services

49

job search counselors about the information available and
how it can be used in their work. In time, no doubt, good
counselors will themselves determine how best to use the in
formation. While benefit reviewers may be more concerned
about the UI claimant's continuing eligibility under the law,
they should also have some knowledge of and appreciation
for current labor market information. It can help them
evaluate more wisely the genuineness of the claimant's job
search and attachment, and also whether the claimant needs
more or closer job search counseling.

Diagnostic and Counseling Services
While diagnosis of the job search needs and employment
prospects of unemployed workers may be more art than
science, past experience and various demonstration projects
in recent years indicate that reasonable diagnosis is feasible
and operationally useful in many, if not most, cases even at
the time the individual first registers for work. Moreover, the
process stands to gain in effectiveness as improvements ac
cumulate in labor market information, in data about the
employability of jobseekers, and in the ability to collate the
two through increasingly sophisticated and computerized
analysis. 5 Since the diagnostic process is not infallible,
periodic reassessment of the jobseeker's situation is
necessary when unemployment continues, especially where
that reassessment may carry implications for income support
eligibility.
5. For evidence and discussion of the application of diagnostic classification to UI
claimants, see: David W. Stevens, Assisted Job Search for the Insured Unemployed
(Kalamazoo, MI: The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, January 1974), p.
35 ff; Paul L. Burgess and Jerry L. Kingston, Unemployment Insurance, the Job Search
Process and Reemployment Success (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor,
Employment and Training Administration, Unemployment Insurance Service, June 1974)
and David Stevens, Unemployment Insurance Beneficiary Job Search Behavior: What is
Known and What Should Be Known for Administrative Planning Purposes, UI Occasional
Paper Series No. 77-3 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and
Training Administration, Unemployment Insurance Service, 1977).
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As noted in chapter III, except for those on a temporary
layoff, all unemployed workers who file for UI or UA under
JSS would receive an initial diagnosis of their reemployment
prospects within a few weeks after first filing and registering
for work with the ES. The diagnosis would be based primari
ly on information supplied by each worker on UI and ES
forms covering work experience, reasons for job separa
tions, skills, education, training, and other facts relevant to
job search, and on current labor market information. As a
result of the diagnosis, the worker would be classified as
"job ready" or "less readily employable."
The local JSS office would notify workers who are job
ready that they should actively seek work in their usual oc
cupations, since employment prospects seem favorable. The
notice should invite them to make use of ES facilities and job
search aids that are available. It may repeat some informa
tion provided when they first filed for benefits or registered
at the ES, but a formal communication after a few weeks
would serve to emphasize the importance of active job search
and to encourage further search. It might also indicate that if
no job is found by a specified date, the worker should ar
range for a meeting with a job search counselor to discuss
methods for seeking work and any problems being en
countered. If the worker does not take the initiative to ar
range a meeting shortly after the date indicated, the office
should do so if the worker is still filing for benefits.
Jobseekers who are diagnosed as less readily employable
in their usual jobs, or who have had problems finding or
holding jobs before, should be scheduled for a meeting with
a job search counselor within two or three weeks of first fil
ing for benefits. The nature of the discussion at this meeting
is covered in chapter III (see section on the less employable
job seeker). The counselor should summarize the content of
the discussion, including any job search plan or other action
agreed to, and send a copy to the worker and to the benefit
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reviewer assigned to the individual. The benefit reviewer
would then be responsible for following up with the claimant
if the latter is still filing for benefits about a month to six
weeks later.
If unemployment continues that long, the benefit reviewer
would call in the claimant to go over the results of his or her
recent job search activity. The reviewer would determine
whether the job search counselor should reassess the
worker's prospects and consider other possible steps to take.
When unemployment lasts a long time, a periodic review
would normally take place about every six to eight weeks and
must occur when the claimant files for a new tier of UI
benefits or for unemployment assistance. The review process
should stress the positive job search objective and not begin
primarily as an attempt to determine if the claimant is
avoiding employment or is not looking for work with ap
propriate diligence. The latter information may well emerge
from the discussion and lead to a benefit disqualification,
but that result is not the initial purpose of the process.
Whether and how often the job search counselor
reassesses the worker's situation or classification would de
pend on the individual's circumstances and labor market
conditions. For example, any one or more of the following
developments may occasion a reassessment:
a. The job-attached worker may find that the layoff has
become permanent or indefinite rather than temporary
and short term;
b. The labor market may deteriorate because of a slump
in business or some other factor which eliminates
favorable job prospects;
c. Labor market information available at the previous
assessment may have been inadequate, incorrect, or
misinterpreted;
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d. The worker's personal circumstances may have chang
ed so as to place obstacles in the path of the job search,
or they previously were not accurately reported or were
misinterpreted.
A worker classified as job ready may have difficulty find
ing a job in his or her usual employment. Staff should be
alert to possibilities for broadening the worker's range of
search by including job possibilities that are not the usual
line of work but are close enough to be worth considering.
When drawing benefits, the worker can be increasingly en
couraged and even subjected to some pressure to broaden the
search range, since failure to do so may jeopardize eligibility
for benefits. The proposed revised structure for UI is design
ed to accommodate a reassessment which requires greater
flexibility in job search expectations.
With regard to the impact of a general recession on job
prospects, it is necessary to recognize that until conditions
begin to improve, job-attached or job-ready applicants may
continue in these classifications for some time. Periodic
reassessments should nevertheless be applied so as not to
miss opportunities for broadening the job search when con
ditions permit. Despite a general recession, favorable job
prospects may exist in some areas or in some occupations.
As the process of diagnosis, review, and reassessment is
systematically and assiduously applied, it will probably im
prove and be refined further. Staff should become more
skillful as they gain experience in applying the procedures.
The labor market information available for the purpose may
also improve as needs clarify. To the extent state UI offices
are applying the procedures of the current Eligibility Review
Program, staff experience will accumulate that can be
adapted readily to the JSS procedures. The main difference
is the greater intensity and greater emphasis on job search
assistance in the JSS approach. The employment service
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should be more involved in the process. The job search
counselor should serve as the link between the ES and the UI
or UA programs.

Training and Other Vocational
Adjustment Services
Unemployed workers classified as less readily employable
reflect a variety of problems, each calling for different treat
ment. In some cases, the problems and the remedies required
are multiple. Despite progress with efforts to establish job
readiness, these persons often remain only marginally attrac
tive to employers as workers, especially in loose labor
markets. Others may prove to be relatively unyielding to ad
justment efforts. Where the obstacles are multiple and deeprooted, the necessary motivation and perseverance may be
impossible to sustain. At least at the outset, however, each
case should be deemed susceptible of rehabilitation or ad
justment. Continued unemployment after some training or
other measures may be due as much to inadequate or inap
propriate treatment of the individual's problems, or to very
limited demand for labor at the time, as it is to his or her own
intractability.
It is useful to group the less employable jobseekers into
two categories. One includes workers with considerable
employment experience, with well-established labor force at
tachment, but who for one or more reasons have difficulty in
finding adequate employment. The other group consists of
less experienced workers or workers with unstable employ
ment experience, with inadequate skills, or with physical,
emotional, or social handicaps that reduce their employability.
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Long-experienced workers
Several types of problems can be identified which cause
substantial difficulty and delay in regaining employment for
jobseekers with good established work records. One is a defi
cient understanding of how to look for work. Job search is
rarely easy; it may be the hardest task a person faces. Know
ing how to look does not come instinctively. Some
jobseekers with viable skills and good experience who have
not had to seek employment for many years may lack any
knowledge about job search techniques. That may be their
only obstacle to reemployment, yet it is a serious one. The
JSS should be alert to this possibility, especially when
reviewing the situations of workers initially classified as job
ready but who do not regain employment in a reasonable
period of time. Instruction about appropriate job search
methods and adequate guidance during the search may be all
the remedy needed. Considerable experience has ac
cumulated with regard to job search methodology. Special
training or workshops in search techniques and their applica
tions have been shown to be valuable. The JSS should be
prepared to supply such service when needed.6
Another problem is structural unemployment. Workers
who lose their jobs because of a technological change in pro
duction techniques which makes their skills obsolete, or who
are phased out with the reduction, closure, or relocation of
their employers' business activities, are examples of victims
of structural unemployment. Unless their skills are transferrable to other fields, they may face long term unemploy
ment. Some are older workers who suffer the additional
burden of age discrimination. Retraining is a potential
answer. Acquisition of new skills, or the updating or
6. For a discussion of developments in counseling and training unemployed workers in jobseeking techniques, see "Job Search Assistance: A Review," by Robert Wegmann in Jour
nal of Employment Counseling, December 1979.
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upgrading of existing skills, can overcome the problem if
there is a demand for those skills in the local labor market.
Relocation may be an answer in other cases.
One of the difficulties in prescribing retraining and reloca
tion is that the worker may be unwilling to accept so quickly
the need for adjustment, especially if it means the possibility
of lower earnings, a long delay in getting back on a regular
job, or a disruptive and costly move. Structurally un
employed workers who can benefit from training might be
encouraged to move more quickly by offering certain incen
tives. A supplemental training allowance, on top of the UI
benefit, is one possibility; assurance of longer benefit protec
tion to cover the training period and subsequent job search is
another. 7 Arrangements might be made with employers for
on-the-job training of such workers whereby lower earnings
might be supplemented for a time by partial unemployment
benefits. Financial assistance may be appropriate to help
cover travel and relocation costs and might be supplied to
claimants seeking a job in another area or moving to take a
job.
Workers laid off because of the adverse effects of foreign
competition are also structurally unemployed. Under provi
sions of the Federal Trade Act of 1974, they may receive
Trade Adjustment Allowances which substantially supple
ment the UI weekly benefit and duration of benefits. They
are also eligibile for various adjustment services. Other
special programs provide similar benefits for structurally
unemployed workers in certain industries. 8 It may be well to
generalize on this more generous approach for all workers
laid off for structural reasons, particularly if the added
7. Michigan provides an extension of UI duration for up to 18 more weeks of benefits to
continue the compensation of recipients who are in approved training that lasts beyond the
regular UI duration limit.
8. See footnote 5, ch. I.

56

Employment Services

benefits are made available as inducements to encourage
them to undertake adjustments more quickly.
Most training and related remedial measures are currently
supplied through CETA-sponsored programs. Income and
other requirements may bar entry for structurally
unemployed workers. Moreover, their training needs may be
quite different from those of the usual CETA program
enrollees. JSS should arrange for training and other adjust
ment services designed for the experienced unemployed who
need assistance to maintain their viability in a changing labor
market.
Some workers, after years of steady and satisfactory
employment, run into difficulties because of emerging per
sonal problems that may be unrelated to their vocational
abilities but which interfere with their ability to perform on
the job. They may lose their jobs as a result. Without some
outside help, they may be unable to resolve their problems,
which can include the onset of bad health, family instability,
and emotional breakdown. Alcoholism and drug abuse are
other examples which loom large. The JSS should work with
employers to arrange referrals of such workers to communi
ty agencies that can help in an effort to prevent the problem
from getting out of hand and to forestall layoffs. If the
worker does lose the job, the JSS should try to identify the
problem and support efforts to resolve it. Where needed,
some financial assistance should be available to help pay the
costs of medical or counseling services obtained to deal with
these problems.

Other less readily employable jobseekers
An important part of this category consists of unemployed
youths, particularly those who recently graduated from
school or left school before completion. Many eventually
work their way into regular employment after some trial and
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error experience, and that is not necessarily an objectionable
process. The process, however, is often disorganized, ineffi
cient, and more prolonged than necessary. The problem is
not so much a matter of finding jobs, but rather one of ob
taining appropriate regular or stable employment which
enables young workers to develop good experience and
skills. They can usually work enough to meet the work or
earnings qualifying requirements for UI and therefore enter
the JSS in this way. In many instances, however, they are
disqualified for UI because they quit jobs.
In the past, the public employment services have attempt
ed to supply guidance in one way or another to ease the tran
sition from school to work. The means employed include
special counseling and placement services for youths, and the
promotion of vocational guidance in the schools. These ef
forts have been neither universal nor continuous. It is impor
tant to build a strong, steady program of vocational
guidance covering all senior and junior high schools and in
volving a close active working relationship between JSS and
school staff. Students should be exposed early and often to
instruction about the realities of work, occupations, careers,
and job search techniques. When youngsters do apply for
help at a JSS office, the system should be prepared to work
closely with them, on a long-range basis if necessary, until a
pattern of regular, stable employment is established.
CETA training and work experience programs focus
heavily on young people with the more difficult problems
that are frequently associated with poverty and discrimina
tion. Disadvantaged, ill-educated youths from poor
households are especially in need of vocational preparation,
and many CETA programs are designed for them. These in
clude the Job Corps and newer programs authorized by the
Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of
1977. Low family income is usually a prerequisite, and a
training allowance may be provided in some cases. Most
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young people who enroll in a CETA program do so directly,
without first applying at the public employment office.
Those who do apply at the ES and who may qualify for
CETA should be referred to the CETA agency.
A somewhat similar set of employment problems exists for
women who reenter the labor force after lengthy absence.
Most find jobs on their own. Others may need some
guidance or assistance in establishing a regular employment
pattern. If they apply for benefits or services under the JSS,
they should receive appropriate treatment. Special training
or work-preparation programs are emerging more widely for
homemakers planning to seek employment or who have
worked part-time or sporadically and now want regular
work. The JSS should refer them to such programs where
they are available, or help to form one as needed. CETA
may also be dealing with these needs, and the JSS should
cooperate and participate in developing the appropriate ser
vices, since not all the women who can benefit are eligible for
CETA assistance.
Coordination with CETA would be especially important
for JSS if the proposed unemployment assistance program is
established. Women now on AFDC who are expected to be
available for work would, in many cases, qualify for UA;
some might qualify for UI after some work experience. As is
now the case with WIN, the state agency would be responsi
ble under JSS to supply or arrange for vocational adjustment
assistance for these women to enhance their employability.
Some training and other work experience programs provided
through CETA could be used or adapted for the purpose. In
addition to the lack of job skills and experience, nonvocationally-related personal problems are also likely to be
present among this group. Poor health, emotional instabili
ty, family disruption, alcoholism, unreliable child care ar
rangements, and other difficulties may have to be treated
before, or along with, vocational preparation. Some com-

Employment Services

59

munity resources may be available to such individuals, and
they should be encouraged to turn to them for help. Often
those resources are limited or not accessible for the
unemployed. JSS and CETA should seek expansion of and
greater accessibility to such assistance.
The objective of WIN and related efforts is to bring such
people into increasing self-support, weaning them away
from welfare. "Graduation" to unemployment assistance or
UI, after some job experience, may signify an important for
ward step in the process. The JSS should be prepared to sup
ply continuing guidance and remedial services in these cases
until the worker becomes well-established and selfsustaining.
Another group of less readily employable jobseekers con
sists of underemployed workers, particularly those who
work part-year in seasonal jobs and who want year-round
employment. Many draw unemployment benefits in the off
season. The JSS would diagnose such benefit recipients for
possible preparation for year-round jobs and encourage or
even require them to undertake appropriate training or work
experience as a condition for continued benefits.
Job Creation and Subsidized Employment
Although not assumed as a function of the JSS, the crea
tion and funding of a large number of temporary public ser
vice jobs has become, under CETA, a major strategy for
alleviating long term structural and cyclical unemployment.
CETA specifies essentially two types of public service
employment. One (under Title II of the Act) emphasizes the
work experience or training aspect of the job for structurally
unemployed and other less readily employable jobseekers.
The intent is to enable the individual placed in the job to
move into regular employment as the result of the ex
perience. The other type of public service employment (Title
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VI) supplies work opportunities during recession periods
when normal jobs are temporarily curtailed. Instead of
drawing income support for prolonged periods, the
unemployed worker can use the time to render a productive
public service that might not otherwise be performed. The
scope and volume of public service employment may face
restriction in coming years. 9
New jobs are also created for the unemployed in the
private sector through federally funded expansion of public
works concentrated in high-unemployment areas and during
periods of heavy unemployment. Moreover, there are now
special federal tax credits available under certain conditions
to employers who hire persons from particularly disadvantaged groups, such as low-income youth, Vietnam veterans,
and handicapped individuals. 10 These credits represent a por
tion of the wages paid to such workers. In addition, stronger
efforts are being made in other ways to engage private in
dustry more in dealing with long term and hard-core
unemployment by developing more training and work ex
perience opportunities in private sector jobs. 11
The major expansion in jobs for the unemployed during
recent years of high unemployment has come in CETAfunded public service employment. By and large, JSS clients
would not be likely to qualify for such jobs unless they have
remained unemployed for a long period of time (for at least
9. Public service employment has become increasingly criticized as a countercyclical
measure for coming on too late, for staying on too long, for substituting for state and local
funding of regular government jobs instead of financing new jobs, for supporting un
productive work, and for poor management. It is also criticized for being inadequate con
sidering the large numbers of unemployed who are unable to find regular jobs in relatively
good times as well as bad, and for an inadequate variety of types of work experience in jobs
provided under Title II.
10. The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit program was established under the Revenue Act of 1978.
11. The efforts include support under Title VII of CETA for a Private Sector Initiatives
Program (PSIP) and local Private Industry Councils to help plan and promote PSIP, and
the increasing involvement of private sector employers in local employment service ad
visory committees under the Job Service Improvement Program.
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15 weeks) and are from low-income households. When
clients are eligible, the JSS should consider referrals to those
jobs, as appropriate.
Working temporarily, even at something less rewarding or
desirable than what the worker wanted or usually did, should
be considered preferable to long term income support, pro
vided it is useful work. Prolonged idleness may undermine
the unemployed worker's self-respect and basic attachment
to the labor force, as well as normal work habits and
discipline. Created temporary employment of this nature
provides the JSS with another means for protecting the
security of workers as workers. With adequate advance plan
ning, there is probably much in the way of worthwhile work
that could be accomplished through this means that would
not otherwise be done.
Recent welfare reform proposals also emphasize the crea
tion of more public service jobs to assure the substitution of
work for welfare for those able to work. This policy would
operate to shift employable AFDC recipients into an increas
ingly solid attachment to the labor force. Job security, rather
than income security, would become the primary means for
assuring their welfare. The establishment of an unemploy
ment assistance program, as proposed under JSS, would
carry this concept even further. Temporary public service
and private sector jobs would serve as an important means
for guiding UA recipients toward self-supporting regular
employment.
Because of the widespread criticism of public service
employment in recent years and the way the political climate
has shifted toward less enthusiasm for that approach, more
emphasis is likely to be given in the future to private sector
initiatives. Broadening the present limited job tax credit pro
gram or developing other types of public wage subsidies
could aim at expanding on-the-job training or work ex-
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perience opportunities in private industry. That approach
can enlarge the variety of training and experience beyond
what is possible in public service jobs and enhance prospects
for regular permanent employment in the private sector.
Care must be taken to be sure that employers do not use the
subsidies to replace regular workers by subsidized workers,
comparable to the substitution effect encountered with
public service employment.

V. THE THREE-TIER
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAM
The elements of the Job Security System which would
modify present arrangements most significantly are the in
come support programs. Unemployment insurance would be
substantially restructured and a new unemployment
assistance program would be established. This chapter
discusses the proposed reform of UI; chapter VI discusses
UA.

The Present UI Structure
The existing federal-state UI system, now over 45 years
old, has much the same basic framework with which it
began. Each state has its own program defined by its own
statutory provisions. The state is responsible for raising its
own funds to finance the benefits it pays. State UI provisions
specify the qualifying requirements, eligibility conditions,
and the weekly amount and duration of benefits payable.
Except for a few federal requirements applicable largely to
eligibility rules, each state determines its own benefit provi
sions. These vary considerably among states as a result.
Federal UI law has more influence over state UI benefit
financing, but even here each state has wide latitude in set
ting UI tax rates and the level of reserves it maintains. In ef
fect, federal law prohibits a state from setting its employer
tax rates below 2.7 percent of taxable payrolls except on the
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basis of experience rating. 1 All states, therefore, provide
experience-rated taxes, 2 but taxes on employers with similar
experience can and do vary greatly among the states. The
federal government has even more impact on the administra
tion of the program, mainly because it finances ad
ministrative costs through annual grants to the states out of
revenues from the Federal Unemployment Tax (FUT) on
employer payrolls. There are also a number of statutory
federal requirements with which the states must comply in
the administration of their laws.
Two important features have been added to the program's
basic structure since it began. One is a provision for federal
loans to states with exhausted benefit reserves to enable them
to continue paying benefits. Repayable, interest-free ad
vances may be obtained by such states from a federal loan
fund accumulated out of FUT revenues. The borrowing state
must repay after about two to three years, or have its debt
reduced in annual installments through reductions in the tax
credit its employers can take each year against the federal
unemployment tax. 3 If the federal loan fund is insufficient to
meet all needs, it may draw repayable advances from the
U.S. Treasury. 4
The other added feature is the provision of extended
benefits (EB) during periods of high unemployment.
Enacted in 1970, the EB program provides for a 50 percent
1. A Federal Unemployment Tax (currently 3.4 percent), which applies to each covered
employer's taxable payroll, may be offset by the amount of state UI tax the employer pays,
up to 2.7 percent of payroll; if the employer pays less than 2.7 percent to the state, an addi
tional tax credit is allowed against the federal tax to cover the difference (i.e., the full 2.7
percent credit may be taken) if the state tax was reduced on the basis of the unemployment
experience of the employer's work force.
2. Except for Puerto Rico, considered a "state" in the UI system.
3. See footnote 1 explaining the tax credit.
4. The federal loan fund accumulates up to a limit of $550 million, which was well short of
needs in the mid-1970s.
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extension of the regular benefit duration payable to
claimants under the state law, up to a 39-week maximum for
regular benefits and EB combined. Extensions trigger on
automatically when state or national insured unemployment
rates exceed specified levels, and trigger off when they fall
below those levels. Each state is responsible for financing
half the costs of the EB it pays; the other half is financed by
the federal government out of an account accumulated for
the purpose from PUT revenues. If this account is depleted,
as was the case in the mid-1970s, it is replenished by
repayable U.S. Treasury advances. In effect, then, the ex
isting federal-state UI system is a two-tiered program a
basic tier of regular state benefits generally compensating up
to the first 26 weeks of unemployment and, for those ex
hausting regular benefits when unemployment is high, a sec
ond tier of federal-state shared EB covering up to 13 addi
tional weeks of unemployment to an overall maximum of 39
weeks. 5
In 1971 and in 1974, Congress provided for temporary
supplemental benefit programs for the recessions then in
progress. While they lasted, these programs provided addi
tional weeks of benefits for claimants who exhausted
EB up to another 13 weeks under each program, and up to
26 more weeks for a while during the later program, with
overall potential maximums of 52 and 65 weeks of benefits.
All the costs of these supplemental benefits in effect, a
third tier were wholly federally financed, at first out of
PUT revenues, but later from general revenues. These
benefits were payable only in states where the insured
unemployment trigger rate reached specified levels. During
1980, Congress again considered but did not adopt a tem5. In most states, many claimants who exhaust regular benefits draw less than the 26 weeks
maximum and therefore are entitled to fewer than 13 weeks of EB, i.e., less than 39 weeks
in all, when EB is payable. Some states pay regular benefits for more than 26 weeks. During
EB periods, the federal government pays half the cost of regular benefits paid after the 26th
week the overall 39-week limit still applies in these states.
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porary third tier of federal supplemental benefits (FSB) for
the current recession.
On the whole, the existing federal-state UI system has
functioned well, at least until recent years when it ran into
serious financial difficulties. The program has had and con
tinues to have its weaknesses and inadequacies, but it has
never failed to pay the benefits provided under the laws.
Each year, UI helps to sustain the incomes of millions of
jobless workers during periods of temporary unemployment.
In many communities hit hard by unemployment, benefit
outlays uphold the purchasing power needed to keep local
business going and to help prevent further deterioration.
After 45 years, UI has become generally well accepted as an
important and necessary institution in our society.
Duration and Financing Problems
and the National Commission
UI, however, does have its problems. The program has
always been issue-prone, and controversy has swirled almost
continuously about many of its features. Moreover, the
economic setting in which it operates changes constantly.
Without adequate evolution over a long period of time in
response to such change, the program can grow less respon
sive to current needs. Many observers feel that UI has not
evolved enough over the years to avoid that result.
The severe recession of the mid-1970s jolted the UI system
and left it in a good deal of financial disarray. Almost half
the states exhausted their reserves and had to borrow from
the federal loan fund. Total state borrowing reached to over
$5.5 billion by the end of 1978, most of which had to be ad
vanced to the system from general revenues. In addition,
general revenue advances were needed to support federal EB
and FSB costs. The system's outstanding obligations to the
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U.S. Treasury for all advances totaled about $12.5 billion in
late 1980. About half the borrowing states repaid all of their
loans by 1980 and others have repaid part. With another
recession in progress, more financial difficulties threaten to
compound the problem. Further borrowing by states has oc
curred in 1980 and early in 1981. Outstanding state in
debtedness totaled about $5 billion at the close of 1980. 6
The FSB extensions, which carried benefit duration
beyond 39 weeks, and even beyond 52 weeks for a time, have
raised serious questions in some quarters about the UI pro
gram's integrity as a form of insurance against temporary
unemployment. Use of general revenues to finance FSB
breaks out of the traditional pattern of self-contained
financing for UI which has been widely regarded as an im
portant feature of the program's insurance character. These
benefits were perceived by many observers more as welfare
payments than as insurance benefits based on earned rights.
The program's problems, along with its financial crisis in
the mid-1970s, combined to induce Congress to authorize,
for the first time, a national commission devoted entirely to
a study of the UI system and its problems. The National
Commission on Unemployment Compensation (NCUC) car
ried out its comprehensive review of the program from early
1978 through the summer of 1980. Its Final Report, of July
1980, contains its findings, conclusions, and recommenda
tions. The NCUC's recommendations are wide-ranging,
covering all aspects of UI as well as some features of other
programs bearing on UI, such as the public employment ser
vice and special federal unemployment benefit programs for
particular groups of workers, e.g., Trade Readjustment
Assistance. The recommendations vary in the degree of
6. Information about state UI loans and general U.S. Treasury advances based on data
supplied to the author by the Unemployment Insurance Service of the U.S. Department of
Labor's Employment and Training Administration.
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agreement they commanded among Commission members,
ranging from unanimous to very narrow support.
Some observations are appropriate here about two areas
of the Commission's work and recommendations those
relating to benefit duration and to financing since these are
two of the UI problem areas to which the proposed new
three-tier program is addressed.
The Commission chose not to recommend alteration of
the program's basic structure. It suggested that the states
continue to be fully responsible for regular benefits up to at
least 26 weeks maximum duration. A NCUC majority did
support federal minimum benefit standards, however, in
cluding one affecting the amount of base-period employ
ment states may require to qualify for 26 weeks of regular
benefits. This standard specifies that a state may not require
a claimant to have more than 39 weeks of base-period
employment (or an equivalent amount and spread of baseperiod earnings) to be eligible for 26 weeks of benefits. The
Commission also urged a gradual reduction of the 39 weeks
employment limit but did not specify how much lower it
should be eventually. The initial level of the standard would
eliminate the most extreme duration restrictions currently
applicable in several states but would leave many states with
large proportions of claimants qualifying for less than 26
weeks of protection. In 1979, there were 27 states where 40
percent or more of all eligible claimants could not qualify for
26 weeks of benefits and 34 states where over half the
claimants who exhausted regular benefits drew for less than
26 weeks. 7 Adoption of the proposed standard would pro
bably not alter these patterns much until the qualifying re
quirement limit is reduced substantially.
The Commission also recommended retention of the trig
gered EB program for high unemployment periods, carrying
7. Unemployment Insurance Statistics, October-December 1979, pp. 54 and 56.
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benefit duration to an overall maximum of 39 weeks. No
change was suggested in the 50 percent extension of the in
dividual claimant's regular benefit entitlement or in the
federal-state sharing of EB costs. A few improvements were
recommended in the EB trigger mechanism. The discussion
of several other issues relating to EB did not lead to recom
mendations for change.
The basic approach of using a statistical indicator to trig
ger EB sometimes produces odd and arbitrary borderline
results that may not be intended. Statistics on insured
unemployment are not so precise or accurate as to assure
that EB will always trigger on and off at the right time and in
the right place. 8 Wide variation among and within states in
the severity of unemployment has led to some questioning of
the policy of EB payments triggering on nationwide, and
even statewide, and to proposals to eliminate the national
trigger and to trigger EB on a local basis. The NCUC was
evenly divided on the former proposal and rejected the lat
ter. Locally triggered EB seems not at all feasible because it
poses extremely difficult technical problems of statistical
measurement and administration. Another EB concern has
been with the combined long duration of benefits that
claimants with very limited base-period employment can
receive in some states, e.g., qualifying for 39 weeks of
benefits with 20 or fewer weeks of employment. The Com
mission discussed but did not recommend a higher minimum
qualifying requirement for EB.
A majority favored a permanent standby program of FSB,
triggered on a national and state basis. The program would
provide up to two additional segments, each equal to 50 per
cent of the claimant's regular benefit entitlement and subject
to a 13-week limit. Successively higher trigger thresholds
8. Seasonal adjustment of the state trigger rates, as recommended by the NCUC, would be
an important improvement in this regard.
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would apply for each FSB segment, as compared with EB
trigger thresholds, and the overall duration ceilings would be
52 and 65 weeks, respectively. The FSB benefits would be
wholly federally financed out of general revenues. There was
less support for the second FSB segment and for paying FSB
on a national triggered basis.
Commission majorities supported more change when it
came to UI financing. Recommendations included increasing
the federal taxable wage base, charging interest on loans
made to the states from the federal loan fund, and advice to
the states regarding the maintenance of solvent reserve
funds. Another significant recommendation was to establish
a reinsurance plan that would make grants to states from a
nationally pooled fund to ease part of the very heavy cost
burdens some states experience during recession periods. The
Commission did not endorse any of the specific reinsurance
plans that have been advanced, but it did indicate a few
parameters which a majority favored. The plan was to be
modest, financed by a fund accumulated out of FUT revenue
allocations equal at first to no more than 0.1 percent of tax
able payrolls each year. Reinsurance grants to eligible states
would cover no more than 30 percent of defined excess costs,
and less if accumulated reinsurance funds available for a
given year were insufficient to meet the 30 percent level. To
be eligible for a grant, a state's benefit costs for a given
period must equal or exceed 2.7 percent of taxable payrolls.
The way a reinsurance plan defines excess cost or eligibili
ty conditions for a grant tends to pit one group of states
against another. Alternative definitions or conditions can
have very different effects on which states qualify and for
how much. The Commission's recommended minimum re
quirement of a 2.7 percent cost rate would probably preclude
a number of states from receiving grants because they always
have had relatively low rates of insured unemployment and
benefit costs. Those states object to having their employers
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contribute to a fund from which they are very unlikely to
benefit. Under another approach, a minimum percentage in
crease in benefit cost or insured unemloyment levels between
one period and another would qualify a state for a grant
regardless of the absolute level of these measures. High-cost
states object to this idea because they may not be able to
qualify on that basis. One proposed plan would combine
both the absolute level of the insured unemployment rate
and the percentage increase in order to broaden support
among the states. Designing an adequate reinsurance plan
that would command a broad political base among the states
remains problematical.
Features of the Proposed Three-Tier Program
The proposed new UI structure would attack, directly, the
duration and financing problems of the present UI program.
First, the new program would not go beyond the 39th week
of unemployment. Second, all UI benefits would be financed
by state and federal employer payroll taxes with no resort to
general revenues. The proposed financing arrangements
would reduce the likelihood of state fund insolvency.
The proposed program is divided into three segments or
tiers, each providing uniform potential duration of 13 weeks
of benefits. Each tier is governed by different eligibility con
ditions and financed by a different mix of state and federal
taxes. The third tier, which carries benefit protection up to
39 weeks, would be available at all times and would not be
dependent on a triggering mechanism tied to the unemploy
ment level.

The 39-week limit
The justification for the 39-week limit derives from the
basic financing concept underlying UI in this country, the
empirical experience regarding the adequacy of UI duration
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provisions, and the availability of other forms of assistance
for those beyond the protection of UI.
A fundamental principle applying to UI in the United
States is that its costs should be absorbed by business. By this
approach, the costs are allocated to production and in turn
subject to the discipline of the market-price system. Charg
ing UI costs to employers also motivates them to minimize or
avoid laying off their workers. The application of this princi
ple explains the virtually exclusive reliance on employer
payroll taxes to support the program and the experience
rating of those taxes. 9 With such financing, some limit on the
maximum potential liability of individual employers is ap
propriate, and limiting benefit duration seems a reasonable
means for accomplishing it. Also, a duration limit appears
appropriate within this context in that, as unemployment
continues for a very long time, the link between UI benefits
paid as a matter of earned rights and the prior employment
on which they are based becomes increasingly tenuous, and
the benefits paid become less justifiable as the financial
responsibility of employers.
The present UI program began modestly with respect to
benefit duration out of fear of excessive costs. As it became
clear that the program's financial base could support longer
duration, states gradually raised their duration limits to 26
weeks, some even beyond that level. The objective for the
duration provision was that UI benefits should be payable
long enough to carry the great majority of recipients through
their unemployment. This view focuses attention on exhaustees claimants whose unemployment lasts beyond the
UI duration limit.
Historically, the tendency for claimants to exhaust
benefits at given levels of unemployment has related closely
to the statutory limits placed on benefit duration. As states
9. Only 3 states derive some revenues from employee taxes to help finance UI.
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improved their benefit duration provisions, the rate of ex
haustion declined. Since 1960, when the national average
potential duration of regular state benefits reached 24 weeks,
about where it has remained, the national exhaustion rate
has ranged between 18 and 38 percent, varying primarily by
the rate of unemployment (table 2). Among the states, ex
haustion rates vary over a wider range, reflecting variations
in both the duration allowed and the rate of unemployment.
Generally, the more restricted the duration allowed, the
higher the exhaustion rate.
The regular state duration provisions, as a whole, carry a
large proportion of claimants (about 75 to 80 percent)
through their unemployment only when the insured
unemployment rate has been about 3 percent or less. During
the 1970s, unemployment was higher, and so was the number
of exhaustions of regular benefits. During recession periods,
EB comes into play, extending potential duration by half.
During the 1970s, about 65 percent of claimants who drew
EB exhausted those benefits. 10 At that rate, regular and EB
duration combined appeared adequate to carry about 75 to
80 percent of all UI recipients through their unemployment,
even during periods of high unemployment. The combined
limit of 39 weeks of benefits comes close to achieving the ob
jective of carrying the great majority through their
unemployment.
Even so, the numbers exhausting EB during the recession
years of the mid-1970s were large 2.5 million in 1975, 2.4
million in 1976, and 1.8 million in 1977 large enough to ex
plain the FSB extensions during this period. The only alter
native for EB exhaustees is welfare AFDC or state or local
general assistance. These programs, however, are quite
restrictive, so that many EB exhaustees who are in need of
10. Based on total final EB payments from 1970 to 1978 as a percent of first EB payments,
1970 to mid-1978.
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Table 2
Potential Duration of Benefits, Exhaustion Rate, and Insured
Unemployment Rate under Regular State UI Programs
U.S. Averages, 1960-1978________________________
Insured
Average potential
unemployment
Exhaustion
duration of regular
Year_____benefits (weeks)____rate1 (percent) rate2 (percent)
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964

24.0
23.9
23.9
24.1
24.2

26.1
30.4
27.4
25.3
23.8

4.7
5.7
4.3
4.2
3.7

1965
1966
1967
1968

24.1
24.2
24.5
24.3

21.5
18.0
19.3
19.6

2.9
2.2
2.4
2.2

1969

24.4

19.8

2.1

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

24.6
24.5
23.8
24.3
24.4

24.4
30.5
28.9
27.6
31.2

3.4
4.1
3.0
2.5
3.4

1975
1976
1977
1978

24.3
24.0
24.1
24.5

37.8
37.8
33.4
26.8

6.1
4.4
3.7
2.8

SOURCE: Handbook of Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, 1938-1976, and An
nual Supplements, U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration.
1. Claimants receiving final payments in calendar year as a percent of claimants receiving
first payments in a 12-month period ending 6 months earlier.
2. Insured unemployed workers as a percent of covered employment.
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further income support cannot qualify for welfare. AFDC is
not available for families without dependent children and, in
about half the states, for families in which both parents are
present. Without an adequate back-up program for workers
who need further support for a time, the pressures to extend
UI beyond 39 weeks are almost irresistable during recession
years. The UA program of the proposed JSS would relieve
those pressures. The National Commission on Unemploy
ment Compensation recommended the establishment of a
UA program, although it also recommended FSB extensions
beyond 39 weeks for recession periods.

Financing
Under the proposed UI program, the financing arrange
ment for each tier would vary by the mix of state and federal
responsibility, although all financing would rely on employer
payroll taxes levied for the purpose. Presently, each state
finances its regular UI benefits from its own UI reserve fund
accumulated from experience-rated employer payroll taxes. 11
EB costs are shared equally by state UI reserves and the
federal UI trust fund account reserved for extended benefits.
In about half the states, the state pools its share of EB costs
among all its employers; the rest experience rate those costs.
The federal share of EB costs is pooled nationally among all
covered employers.
Under the proposed three-tier program, the states would
be totally responsible for tier 1 costs and probably would
continue to experience rate these costs. In the sense that ex
perience rating reflects the notion that an individual firm
bears the responsbility for the unemployment of its
employees, the full experience rating of short term benefits is
logical. Much unemployment is short term and more likely
11. Some added revenues are raised from employee taxes in three states; Puerto Rico does
not experience rate.
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than longer term unemployment to be controllable, to some
extent, by the employer. One objective of experience rating is
to encourage employers to minimize unemployment; tier 1 is
the most appropriate segment in which to concentrate that
effect.
Tier 2 costs would be shared equally between state and
federal UI reserve funds, as is now the case with EB costs. As
unemployment moves beyond the short term range of tier 1,
the responsbility of the individual firm for the unemploy
ment of its employees grows more and more remote. Na
tional pooling of half the costs of tier 2 benefits ack
nowledges that the continued unemployment is less subject
to employer control and more likely to be the result of
broader forces that are multi-state or national in scope. The
states would be able to choose between pooling or experience
rating the state share of tier 2 costs, as is now the arrange
ment for state EB costs.
An extension of the argument for increased pooling of tier
2 costs leads to support for total national pooling of the UI
costs for the much longer unemployment involved in tier 3.
Federal UI funds would finance all tier 3 benefits.
The three-tier financing arrangement would have two im
portant effects. One would be to reduce the scope of ex
perience rating. While limited to short term tier 1 benefits
and, if the state chooses, half the costs of tier 2, experience
rating would still apply for most of the UI benefit costs of
the first 26 weeks of unemployment. Three-tier cost
estimates, to be discussed below, indicate that tier 1 benefit
costs plus half the costs of tier 2 would account for about 70
to 75 percent of all UI costs under the proposed program.
Tier 1 alone would account for about 60 percent of all costs.
Thus, experience rating would still play a substantial role.
Depending on how a state redesigns its UI tax structure,
confining experience rating to tier 1 costs might provide a
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better opportunity to effectively charge all, or nearly all,
such costs to individual employers. At present, a portion of
benefit costs charged to some high-cost employers is not
covered by their taxes because of maximum tax rates. The
range of existing tax schedules is likely to make experience
rating more completely effective for short term benefit costs.
Employers with seasonal operations that generate a great
deal of short term but little longer term insured unemploy
ment often are at the maximum rate, but some are ineffec
tively charged for all costs. To the extent these employers
have tier 2 and 3 costs which are pooled through a uniform
tax, the experience-rated taxes they now pay at maximum tax
rates would cover more, if not all, of their short term UI
costs.
One other advantage claimed for experience rating, that of
involving employers in verifying the legitimacy of claims for
UI entitlement, would be maintained adequately by the
charging of tier 1 benefits to the separating employer. Since
the cooperation of employers in checking the legitimacy of
claims concerns mainly job separation issues, the employers'
stake in tier 1 benefits would still motivate them to identify
claims that should be disqualified.
The second effect of the three-tier financing arrangement
derives from the expanded national pooling of UI
costs half the benefits of tier 2 and all of tier 3. To a con
siderable extent, the broader pooling would accomplish the
objective of reinsurance without having to establish a special
scheme for the purpose. All the reinsurance or cost equaliza
tion plans advanced so far face a dilemma. Either they
discriminate against low-cost states by concentrating the
reinsurance or cost equalization grants among the high-cost
states, or they allow all states a chance to qualify for grants
without regard to the levels of costs or to unemployment
levels, thereby reducing the grants to high-cost states needed
to offset their "excess costs." Schemes that attempt to strike
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a balance between these two positions often involve complex
mechanisms to determine state eligibility for grants and the
amounts of the grants payable. National pooling of half of
tier 2 and all of tier 3 costs would relieve all states of some
cost burden, and would relieve the high-unemployment,
high-cost states of a larger proportion of their total burden.
High unemployment levels usually mean longer duration of
unemployment and, therefore, proportionately more tier 2
and tier 3 benefits. National pooling of costs in these tiers
would ease the strains on state UI financing and offer better
assurance of fund solvency.

Qualifying requirements
and potential duration
Under their present UI laws, all states require a minimum
amount of employment and/or earnings in a base period to
qualify for any benefits. 12 These minimum requirements
vary a good deal among the states, both in form and level.
As of January 1981, 13 states rquired from 14 to 20 weeks of
employment to qualify. Except for Washington, which
specified a minimum number of hours of work (680) in the
base period, all other states stated their requirements in
terms of earnings. For 16 states, total base-period earnings
had to equal at least a specified multiple of earnings in the
highest quarter, ranging from 1.25 to 1.6. If the claimant
had 13 weeks of work in the high quarter, this range of
multiples was equivalent to a little more than 16 to nearly 21
weeks of work in the base period, provided the weekly
amount earned was constant. Another 16 states required
total earnings equal to at least a specified multiple of the
weekly benefit amount for which the claimant qualified,
12. State UI provisions as of January 1981 are from Comparison of State Unemployment
Insurance Laws and Significant Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance Laws,
January 4, 1981, both issued by the U.S. Department of Labor's Employment and Training
Administration.
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which in turn depended on the level and fraction of highquarter earnings used to calculate the weekly benefit amount
and on the benefit ceiling. The equivalence of this type of re
quirement to weeks of employment is less consistent than
that of the high-quarter multiple. To the extent the
claimant's employment pattern is that needed to make them
equivalent, the weekly benefit multiples, ranging generally
from 30 to 40, would be equivalent to about 15 to 20 weeks
of work. The remaining states required a minimum flat
amount of base-period earnings, from $600 to $1,400, usual
ly with earnings required in at least two quarters. Work time
equivalents are indeterminate for these requirements, but
flat-earnings tests make it possible to qualify with con
siderably less than 14 weeks of work.
These minimum requirements qualify a claimant for a
given level of potential duration, usually the minimum in the
states which vary the weeks allowed by the base-period ex
perience. As of January 1981, 43 states varied the duration
allowed; in the other states, all eligible claimants qualified
for a uniform potential duration. Minimum potential dura
tion in the variable duration states ranged from 4 to 20
weeks. Because of the variation in the duration formulas
used by these states, the number of weeks of employment (or
the equivalent in earnings) needed by claimants to qualify for
26 weeks of benefits ranged widely. In several states, only
claimants who worked all 52 weeks in their base periods
could qualify for 26 weeks; in a few others, only 26 weeks of
employment were needed. 13 Among the uniform duration
states, claimants qualified for 26 or 28 weeks of benefits with
as few as 14 to 20 weeks of work (or the equivalent) in most,
and with the flat minimum amount of base-period earnings
13. In 1980, Pennsylvania replaced its 30-week uniform duration provision by one pro
viding up to 26 weeks of benefits to claimants with at least 18 weeks of base-period employ
ment and up to 30 weeks for those who worked at least 24 weeks.
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required to qualify in a few others. 14 Eight states provided
more than 26 weeks of regular benefits with duration maximums ranging from 28 to 36 weeks among them; they re
quired more base-period employment to qualify for the
longer duration (except for one uniform duration state).
During EB periods, the potential duration that claimants can
draw is 50 percent more (up to a 39-week overall maximum)
without any additional base-period employment required.
Among the uniform duration states, this means that
claimants with as little as 14 to 20 weeks of employment
could qualify for 39 weeks of benefits during EB periods.
The three-tier program would alter this pattern. The quali
fying requirements (except for tier 1) and the potential dura
tion allowed in each tier would be the same in all states. Each
tier would provide a uniform potential duration of 13 weeks,
but the total number of weeks allowed claimants by the pro
gram would vary with their past employment. The three
levels of total potential duration 13, 26, and 39 weeks are
associated with three levels of qualifying requiremets, which
may be more or less than present state requirements for these
levels of potential duration. All three tiers would be available
at all times, without regard to the level of unemployment.
Since tier 1 would be financed entirely by the states, they
would set the qualifying requirements for these benefits. The
requirements for tiers 2 and 3 would be set by federal law;
these may induce the states to adopt tier 1 requirements that
would be consistent with them.It may be desirable, however,
to set a federal standard limiting the range of tier 1 re
quirements. No state now requires more than about 20 weeks
of base-period employment (or the equivalent) to qualify for
minimum benefits.The preferred requirement for tier 1
would fall between 14 and 20 weeks of base-period employ
ment, measured directly in weeks. A high-quarter multiple
14. Puerto Rico provides only 20 weeks of uniform duration.
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requirement would be acceptable as an equivalent if it fell in
the range of 1.1 and 1.5. The weekly benefit amount multiple
and, especially, the flat earnings requirements would not be
acceptable as equivalents.
For tier 2, the qualifying requirement would be 26 weeks
of base-period employment, or annual earnings equal to
twice high-quarter earnings. Because of federal financial
participation in tier 2 benefits with funds raised by a uniform
tax nationwide, it is appropriate to set a uniform require
ment. The same reasoning applies for tier 3. Most states now
require more than 26 weeks of work (or the equivalent) for
potential duration of 26 weeks; the majority require about 39
or more weeks.
The tier 3 qualifying requirement would be 39 weeks of
base-period employment (or an acceptable high-quartermultiple earnings equivalent), but with an alternative of 52
weeks of work in the past 104 weeks (base period and the
preceding year combined). In a period of recession, a
39-week requirement may be difficult to meet. A claimant
who normally works most of the time but who had substan
tial unemployment during the previous year or lost time due
to illness should be able to qualify for the third tier if his
prior work record indicates good regular attachment. The
alternative allows that opportunity.
One other problem with present qualifying requirements
concerns the minimum amount of earnings specified per
week, or per quarter, or per year. For states using a weeksof-work test, a minimum amount of earnings per week is re
quired (in a few states, a minimum average per week). As of
early 1981, these ranged from $20 to $67. In most cases, the
level is changed infrequently, despite rising wage levels which
in time make it easier to meet the requirement with fewer
hours of work per week. The minimum weekly earnings re
quirement should be set as a fraction of the state average
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weekly wage in covered work so that the amount required
adjusts periodically for wage level changes. The fraction
should be small, such as one-fifth or one-sixth, so as not to
screen out low-wage workers, yet high enough to be mean
ingful. Ohio's average weekly wage in 1978 was $256; its
weekly wage requirement has been $20 for many years, now
well under one-twelfth of the average wage; it probably
should be about $50 in 1981. Most weeks-of-work states are
below the appropriate level. The high-quarter multiple re
quirements also tend to specify minimum high-quarter or
base-period earnings requirements that are not in keeping
with current average wage levels. These earnings re
quirements should also be related to the average wage.
There may be some reluctance to require states with very
easy minimum requirements, such as a flat-earnings test, to
adopt the stiffer tier 1 test since it would eliminate from
eligibility marginal, usually low-paid workers who have been
unable to find adequate and more steady work. The higher
requirement would also screen out people who want only a
little part-time work or who limit their employment to very
short term seasonal activity. Under JSS, if the claimants
eliminated represent cases of genuine need, are from lowincome households, and are available for and actively seek
ing work, they would likely be eligible for unemployment
assistance.
One other point needs to be made with respect to how a
claimant's base-period exprience is applied to the qualifying
requirements. Most states now define the claimant's base
period as the first four of the last five completed calendar
quarters prior to the first claim. That leaves a gap of from
three to six months. (It is even more in a few states.) In most
states, information about the base-period experience to be
measured is contained in agency files accumulated for each
covered worker from quarterly earnings reports filed by
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employers in conjunction with their state UI tax returns.
These reports are not submitted until about a month or more
after a quarter ends. More time is needed to post the data.
This process accounts for the gap. Some states do not main
tain worker quarterly wage records but instead request wage
and employment information from former employers when
a claimant files a first claim. In these states, there is no gap;
the most recent months and weeks are included in the base
period. Where a gap exists, as it does in most states,
claimants may fail to meet the requirements simply because
the most recent employment is not included in the base
period. That result is more likely for a recent new entrant or
reentrant to the labor force. Often, such claimants are advis
ed to wait and refile after the turn of another quarter. In the
interest of reducing the effects of such unequal approaches,
it may be appropriate to require states to take account of the
most recent employment, if the claimant falls short of the
requirement, by requesting a report from the recent employer(s).
To sum up, the proposed qualifying requirements and the
potential benefit duration for each tier are as follows:
Potential duration
Minimum requirement:
Base-period employment

Tier 3
Tier 2
Tier 1
13 weeks 13 weeks 13 weeks
14-20
weeks

26 weeks 39 weeks (or 52
weeks in 2-year
base period)

1.1-1.5

2.0

or
High-quarter earnings
multiple equivalent

3.0 (or 4.0 in
2-year base period)

The NCUC has recommended that state minimum qualify
ing requirements should not be less than 14 weeks of baseperiod employment. It recommends the weeks-of-work form
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of the test or the high-quarter multiple equivalent. The Com
mission did not recommend a ceiling for the minimum re
quirement but did urge states to lower their requirements for
26 weeks of potential duration substantially below 39 weeks
of work; it recommended that no state be allowed to require
more than 39 weeks for 26 weeks of benefits. As noted
earlier, the NCUC favored triggered extended benefit dura
tion during periods of high unemployment for exhaustees of
regular benefits.
The proposed three-tier program would operate so that the
movement from one tier to the next would be a distinct, for
mal process that makes clear to the claimant, and also
stresses to the administrative staff, that unemployment has
reached a new and more serious stage requiring different at
titudes toward the search for work and, perhaps, different
approaches. Although the tier qualifying threshold points
may be arbitrary, they nevertheless serve the purpose of
signaling a fresh view of the claimant's problem and help to
create a different psychological atmosphere conducive to
speedier reemployment.

Continuing eligibility and disqualifications
Besides meeting minimum qualifying requirements,
claimants now must satisfy other conditions to be eligible,
and to remain eligible, for benefits. These conditions would
continue to apply under the three-tier program. What would
change, however, is the kind of benefit disqualifications im
posed for failure to meet those conditions.
Under present UI laws, state disqualification provisions
vary considerably. They have become generally more severe
in recent years. Leaving a job voluntarily without good cause
or being discharged for misconduct have always warranted a
suspension of benefits. The same is true for refusing an offer
of a suitable job without good cause. In the past, most states
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suspended benefits for a limited period of time after which
the claimant could draw benefits if still unemployed and
otherwise eligible. The theory was that unemployment con
tinuing beyond the suspension period is caused by labor
market conditions and is no longer the result of the
claimant's own act. By now, however, the majority of states
have adopted provisions calling for benefit suspensions
lasting throughout the claimant's current unemployment;
benefits become payable only after the claimant has worked
again for at least a specified amount of time (or earned at
least a specified amount) and is then laid off under qualify
ing circumstances. Other states still suspend benefits for a
limited period, most from 4 to 13 weeks. In addition to
benefit suspension, some states also reduce a disqualified
claimant's potential duration entitlement.
Under the three-tier program, no state would suspend
benefits for more than 13 weeks for a voluntary quit or
misconduct discharge disqualification. For refusal of a
suitable job, the suspension would not exceed 6 weeks while
the claimant is in tier 1; it could be as long as 13 weeks after
tier 1, allowing states the opportunity to increase pressure on
the claimant to accept a broader range of job offers or refer
rals. In no case would benefit rights be reduced or canceled.
One reason for the recently increased severity of state dis
qualification provisions is that many employers strongly ob
ject to the payment of post-suspension benefits to a former
employee who left the job or was fired for misconduct,
especially when those benefits can contribute to an increase
in the employer's tax rate. That is seen as "adding insult to
injury." Some states have eased this issue by not charging
these benefits to the individual employer's account and by
pooling the costs among all employers instead. A suspension
lasting as long as two or three months appears harsh enough
for the disqualified claimant. The more aggressive pursuit of
new employment under the proposed Job Security System
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and the closer review of the claimant's job search activity can
help prevent malingering, which is commonly attributed to
disqualified claimants and is another reason advanced for
severe treatment.
The guideline long urged by the federal government for
setting the length of the benefit suspension for job separa
tion disqualifications has been the average duration of a spell
of unemployment. Presumably, the average claimant should
find a new job in that time; unemployment beyond that
point is considered the result of poor employment conditions
and not the claimant's fault. That unemployment, it is
argued, has become involuntary, and the claimant should be
entitled to draw benefits. Historically, the average spell
duration has ranged generally from about five to eight
weeks, depending on economic conditions. The average,
however, may be badly understated by the inclusion of
unemployment spells of workers on short term layoffs who
do not seek other jobs. The average for permanently
separated workers is probably higher and therefore may be a
more appropriate guide for the suspension period for dis
qualified workers. Allowing suspensions lasting up to 13
weeks seems consistent with this line of reasoning. The more
moderate suspension period for a job refusal in tier 1 reflects
the less certain circumstances that surround this disqualifica
tion. The related issues of what is a "suitable" job and what
constitutes good cause for refusal leave enough room for
uncertainty about the accuracy of the decision as to warrant
giving the claimant the benefit of the doubt in this way,
especially in the early stages of unemployment.
A claimant who becomes unable to work or is not
available for work is disqualified from benefits during the
period involved. The same rule would apply under the threetier program. One present exception that would continue to
apply is that a claimant who undertakes approved training
remains eligible to draw benefits even though not available
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to take a job while training. Failure, without good cause, to
seek work in ways appropriate to the claimant's occupation
and labor market, or in keeping with a job search plan
developed with JSS staff, also would result in a disqualifica
tion.
Some state laws spell out conditions of availability for
work, active search for work, and the suitability of work in
specific terms. In most cases, the statutory conditions are ex
pressed in general terms, or allow for circumstances under
which the conditions may be applied differently. For exam
ple, registration for work at a local employment office
generally is required, but there are exceptions. Besides
registration, the law usually calls for an active or reasonable
search for work by the claimant, but how active and in what
manner are frequently left to the discretion of the ad
ministrative staff. Most state laws specify the criteria for
"suitability" of the work the claimant should seek or accept,
and there has been some tendency in recent years for these
provisions to become more specific and less flexible. Most
notably, several states have spelled out in their laws precise
reductions in wage levels, relative to the claimant's former
wage or weekly benefit amount, that the claimant would be
required to accept as suitable as unemployment reaches
specific duration points. Rigid application of these condi
tions can produce arbitrary, illogical, and unfair results in
some cases. In the JSS context of periodic individualized
review and counseling, well-trained staff should be capable
of exercising reasonable judgment about "availability" and
"suitability" so as to minimize malingering without the need
for restrictively narrow statutory definitions of these terms.
The National Commission recommended less severity and
less rigidity in state eligibility and disqualification provi
sions. It urged a limited period of benefit suspension for dis
qualified claimants set within a range prescribed by law and
based on individual circumstances. It recommended against
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suspensions lasting until the claimant requalified with new
employment and against reduction of a disqualified clai
mant's benefit rights, except in cases of fraud. With regard
to provisions requiring availability and search for work and
defining suitability of work, the Commission favored more
general terms and their application on a case-by-case basis,
taking account of relevant individual circumstances, labor
market conditions, and hiring practices. The claimant's job
search should be reasonable and appropriate in the light of
these circumstances and judged accordingly.

The weekly benefit amount
States presently determine their own weekly benefit
amount (WBA) formulas, and the variation is very wide. Ex
cept for four states which, as of January 1981, calculated the
WBA as a fraction of the claimant's total base-period earn
ings, all formulas are designed to compensate a claimant for
a fraction of the former weekly wage, usually half or more,
up to a benefit maximum. The long-established objective for
the WBA provision is that the great majority of claimants, or
of potential claimants, should be able to receive at least half
their weekly wage when unemployed. 15 Most states base the
measure of the weekly wage loss on earnings in the high
quarter and calculate the WBA as a fraction (usually onetwenty-sixth or more) of those earnings. Others average the
weekly wage directly over the actual weeks of employment in
the base period and set the WBA as a fraction, ranging from
one-half to two-thirds, of that average wage. Only two states
used high-quarter formulas in 1981 which resulted in WBAs
of less than half the weekly wage (less than one-twenty-sixth
high-quarter earnings) at levels below the maximum.
The major barrier to the achievement of the WBA objec
tive has been the benefit ceilings in state laws. These have
15. This objective was first stated by President Eisenhower in the mid-1950s in an
Economic Report and has been reiterated many times since by succeeding Administrations.
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generally been too low in many states, relative to general
wage levels, so that large proportions of claimants are unable
to receive half or more of their weekly wage as intended by
the basic formulas. In 1979, nationally, about 40 percent of
all claimants were at the maximum WBA, meaning that most
of them received less than half their wage. In 10 states, over
half the claimants were at the ceiling. 16 In the four states
which calculate the WBA as a fraction of annual earnings,
claimants can and do receive less than half their weekly wage
at all benefit levels, not only at the maximum.
Under the three-tier program, because federal UI tax
revenues would be heavily involved in financing benefits, a
greater degree of uniformity among state benefit provisions
would be desirable. Also desirable would be some reduction
of the inequities of the different rates of weekly compensa
tion paid by states to unemployed workers who have earned
the same wage. For these reasons, two federal benefit stan
dards would apply. One would require all state formulas to
assure that, at levels below the ceiling, no claimant receives a
WBA of less tfran half the claimant's weekly wage (or less
than the equivalent high-quarter fraction of one-twentysixth); annual wage formulas would not be acceptable. The
other standard would require the states to set their ceilings as
a fraction of at least two-thirds of the state average weekly
covered wage. Only 13 states set their ceilings this high as of
early 1981; ceilings in about a third of the states, including
several of the largest states, were less than 50 percent of their
average wage levels.
For many states, the required increase in the ceiling would
be a drastic and very costly change to make all at once. The
National Commission recommended the same standards but
with a series of steps over a period of years to reach the ceil16. Unemployment Insurance Statistics, October-December 1979, p. 52.
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ing of two-thirds of the average wage. That approach is a
sensible one.
One other problem concerns states, such as Alaska and
Michigan, with average wage levels well above the national
average. A maximum WBA of two-thirds the state average
wage would mean a ceiling estimated at close to $300 in
Alaska and about $210 in Michigan for 1981, compared with
their actual 1981 ceilings of $150 and $182, respectively (ex
cluding allowances for dependents). The ceilings that the
standard would require in these states seem very high in com
parison with what many workers earn in much of the coun
try, even those at the average wage levels in their states.
These ceilings also would be quite costly. 17 A modified ver
sion of the proposed standard would help moderate the
problem and could be regarded as consistent with the financ
ing arrangements for the three-tier program. Since the
federal share of benefit costs in tiers 2 and 3 would be paid
from funds raised from a uniform federal tax that applies to
a uniform taxable wage base, some limit on the application
of the two-third standard to the state average wage for the
benefit ceiling may be justified. The National Commission
has recommended that the taxable wage base for the federal
tax eventually (by 1989) equal 65 percent of the national
average annual wage in covered employment. States with
average weekly wages above the national average could
choose to set the required benefit ceiling at the two-third
standard or as a percentage of the national average weekly
17. Alaska has the added problem of the effects of extreme seasonal patterns on earnings.
Since a large proportion of workers in that state are unable to work year-round because of
very long and cold winters, their weekly earnings tend to be much higher when they do
work than would normally be the case. Many workers command higher wage rates because
of these conditions and many work a great deal of overtime. The state average weekly wage
level, computed on the basis of an average level of employment throughout the year,
therefore seriously overstates what the average normally would be, given a more usual
employment pattern. Alaska calculates the WBA as a fraction of annual rather than weekly
or high-quarter earnings.
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wage equal to the percentage used to determine the ap
plicable federal taxable wage base. Assuming that the na
tional average weekly wage for 1980 was about $275, and
that a taxable wage base equal to 65 percent of the 1980 na
tional average annual wage was in force for 1981, then no
state ceiling would need to be higher than $179 in that year.
As of early 1981, eight states had ceilings above $179, most
of them only when dependents are taken into account.
Not much attention has been given to the minimum WBA
payable. State UI weekly minimums in January 1981 ranged
from $5 to $43. They were under $20 in almost half the
states. In most states, minimum WBAs have gone up very lit
tle or not at all over recent years despite steadily rising wage
levels. Relatively few UI recipients draw the minimum or
near minimum weekly amounts and little is known about
them. Many probably are claimants who had worked part
time. Even at the $3.35 federal minimum wage level ap
plicable in 1981, a worker employed for only 20 hours a week
can earn $67 and qualify for a $34 benefit at the 50 percent
replacement rate. Only 10 states had a minimum this high as
1981 began. Minimum WBAs are clearly behind the times.
While not a very important factor as far as UI is concerned,
the UI minimum takes on more significance for weekly
unemployment assistance amounts, as explained in chapter
VI.
One approach that seems reasonable is to relate the UI
minimum WBA to the minimum amount of weekly earnings
specified in the qualifying requirement. The suggestion made
above with respect to the qualifying requirement is to set the
minimum weekly earnings required as a fraction (one-fifth
or one-sixth) of the statewide average weekly covered wage.
Based on estimated 1980 state average weekly wages, a
minimum weekly earnings requirement of one-fifth and a 50
percent replacement rate, minimum WBAs in 1981 probably
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would exceed $20 in all states (perhaps only Puerto Rico
would be lower).
Dependents' allowances also affect the WBA. Thirteen
states currently take account of dependents in their for
mulas. The standards discussed above apply to benefits
before dependents are considered. Under the three-tier pro
gram, states would continue to be free to add dependents'
allowances if they wish, but the proportion of the claimant's
weekly wage compensated by the WBA, including
allowances, would not exceed 75 percent in any case. A
higher proportion, as can occur now in a few states for a
claimant with many dependents, may come too close to the
claimant's take-home wage level and seriously weaken the
work-incentive effect of the benefit-wage differential.

Partial or reduced weekly benefits
All states have partial benefit formulas so that a claimant
can draw a reduced WBA if the normal work schedule is
reduced appreciably, or if the claimant takes temporary parttime work while waiting to return to a regular job or while
looking for a full-time job. Most partial benefit formulas,
however, given little encouragement to such part-time
employment even when it is available and desirable as a tem
porary measure. Nor do they encourage work sharing,
whereby an employer keeps all workers employed but on a
temporarily reduced schedule rather than lay off completely
part of the workforce. Under most formulas, the amount
earned (or most of it) is offset against the WBA so that even
moderate earnings tend to wipe out all benefits leaving little
or no incentive to take such employment or to share work.
For example, a fairly typical provision (used by about half
the states) holds that a claimant earning as much as or more
than the WBA can receive no benefit at all; if less is earned,
the full WBA is reduced by the amount earned less a modest
portion (a "disregard") ranging usually from $2 to $15 or
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from 20 to 40 percent of the WBA. In most other states, the
provision is very similar except that a partial benefit is
payable if the claimant's earnings come to less than the WBA
plus the amount of the disregard.
Recent interest in work sharing has focused greater atten
tion on the limitations of present partial UI benefit for
mulas. Work sharing is used extensively and successfully in
other industrial nations with UI provisions that accom
modate that approach. California has been experimenting
with UI provisions which make work sharing feasible and
worthwhile. 18 A temporarily reduced workweek may be a
better response than total layoffs to a brief business slump.
Continued work experience and fringe benefits are impor
tant considerations. If a full layoff eventually is necessary, a
reduced workweek for a period before that event may help
the worker find new employment while still employed. Job
search prospects are almost always better for an employed
worker than an unemployed one. Partial benefit provisions
should help support work sharing under controlled condi
tions.
Where partial benefits are payable in the case of a reduced
work schedule, the work reduction should be a general one
applicable to all workers in a plant or establishment, or to a
well-defined class of such workers. The reduction should be
temporary. Other conditions may have to apply to assure
that a bona fide reduction has occurred. If the reduction
continues beyond a certain period of time, and other suitable
full-time job opportunities are available, affected workers
should be referred to such jobs.
A partial benefit formula designed to encourage a claim
ant to accept temporary part-time work or a reduced work
schedule in place of a total layoff should allow the worker to
18. Fred Best, Work Sharing: Issues, Policy Options and Prospects (Kalamazoo, MI: The
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1981).
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increase his total income (reduced earnings plus the partial
benefit) above what it would be if he were totally
unemployed and drawing his full WBA. The formula should
not, however, result in total income equal to what the claim
ant earned when fully employed.
Under the three-tier program, state partial benefit for
mulas would provide a partial WBA to claimants who take
temporary part-time jobs or have a temporary workschedule reduction as part of a general work sharing plan.
Separate formulas would apply for each type of reduced
earnings. In the case of a temporary part-time job, a partial
WBA would be payable if the claimant earns no more than
75 percent of his usual full-time wage or one-and-one-half
times his WBA, whichever is less. The full WBA would be
reduced by a fraction of not more than two-thirds of the
claimant's current earnings. In the case of work sharing, a
partial benefit would be payable when the reduced schedule
is not more than 80 percent of the normal workweek, such as
a reduction from five to four days. The partial WBA payable
would be the proportion of the full WBA that the hours of
work lost represented of the normal workweek. A week of
partial benefits would count as a part-week against the
claimant's total benefit entitlement. Thus, a partial benefit
equal to half the full WBA would count as a half-week
against the claimant's total entitlement.
Claimants who take temporary part-time work could
receive a partial benefit at any time during any of the three
tiers. Partial benefits payable under work sharing plans
would be payable only in tiers 1 and 2 and for only the
equivalent of 13 full weeks of benefits.
The National Commission recommended that states
change their partial benefit formulas so that claimants would
be encouraged to take part-time jobs. It suggested that the
WBA be reduced by a percentage rather than all of the earn-
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ings made. The Commission took no position with regard to
work sharing plans and their relationship to partial benefit
provisions. It did urge continued research and evaluation of
the various proposals and the issues involved.
One other type of partial benefit is introduced under the
three-tier program, although on an experimental basis in a
few states at first. It would be payable only in tier 3 to a
claimant who accepts new full-time employment at wages
well below wages earned in previous employment. The par
tial benefit would constitute a temporary wage supplement
to induce a claimant who had been unemployed for 26 or
more weeks to take a lower-paying job. The partial WBA
would be calculated in the same way as for that payable to a
claimant taking a temporary part-time job.

Cost Estimates for the Three-Tier Program
Estimates have been prepared of the size and costs of the
three-tier program compared with existing UI programs.
They are based on a model constructed from information
obtained on the 1976 National Survey of Income and Educa
tion and from other studies of labor force experience. The
model can be applied to estimate benefit costs generated by
alternative state UI provisions for given years at specified
rates of unemployment. 19 Through this model, U.S. Depart
ment of Labor staff has developed estimates for the threetier program and existing programs under specified assump
tions. The estimates must be regarded as tentative since there
may be some question about the model's capacity to deter
mine accurately for each state the eligibility of unemployed
workers for the three tiers based on the employment and
earnings information it contains. National estimates are
19. The model was prepared by The Urban Institute for the National Commission on
Unemployment Compensation and the U.S. Department of Labor for use in estimating the
costs and effects of Commission recommendations and of other possible changes in UI.
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probably more reliable than the individual state estimates;
the national figures are totals of the state figures. 20
With these reservations in mind, the national estimates
that were prepared for the three-tier program and the ex
isting UI programs are presented in table 3. The following
conditions and assumptions apply for the estimates:
1. The state provisions used for existing UI programs
are as of January 1980.
2.

January 1980 state WBA provisions apply for the
three-tier estimates rather than the WBA provisions
proposed above.

3. The qualifying requirements applied for each state for
tier 1 eligibility are 14 weeks of base-period employ
ment and total base-period earnings equal to 14 times
20 percent of the statewide average weekly covered
wage estimated for 1979.
4.

The qualifying requirement applied for tier 3 is 26
weeks of work in the base period, the same as for tier
2, rather than 39 weeks. The proposed alternative for
tier 3 of 52 weeks in the base period and preceding
year for those with less than 39 weeks of base-period
work was not applied since the longer record is not
available. The result is some overstatement of the
number of tier 3 claimants and benefit costs.
(Estimates of tier 3 costs when applying a 39-weeks
requirement are about 7 to 10 percent less than those
eligible with a 26-weeks test; the alternative require
ment would reduce the differences.)

5. Three-tier estimates do not reflect proposed dis
qualification provisions.
20. Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands are not included in these estimates.
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Table 3
National Estimates of Benefit Costs and Claimants Under Existing
UI Programs and the Proposed Three-Tier Program, 1980

Item

Unemployment rate assumed
5.5 percent 6.6 percent 7.5 percent 8.5 percent
(dollar estimates in millions; others in thousands)
19,260

20,943

22,384

24,002

Persons eligible
Regular UI benefits
Tier 1 benefits

8,152
7,962

9,086
8,877

9,913
9,690

10,780
10,542

First payments
Regular UI program
Extended benefits

6,625
33

7,629
210

8,548
1,050

9,318
2,412

First payments
Tier 1 benefits
Tier 2 benefits
Tier 3 benefits

6,395
2,489
1,117

7,354
3,066
1,492

8,268
3,700
1,875

9,018
4,179
2,194

Exhaustions
Regular UI program
Extended benefits

1,220
20

1,643
127

2,062
652

2,414
1,450

Exhaustions
Tier 1 benefits
Tier 2 benefits
Tier 3 benefits

2,620
1,117
536

3,253
1,492
765

3,901
1,875
1,009

4,418
2,194
1,137

$9,186
29

$11,256
171

$13,139
1,047

$14,771
2,415

$9,215

$11,427

$14,186

$17,186

$6,350
2,631
1,196

$7,580
3,387
1,671

$8,668
4,140
2,130

$9,658
4,734
2,497

Persons with unemployment

Benefits paid
Regular UI program
Extended benefits
Total
Benefits paid
Tier 1 benefits
Tier 2 benefits
Tier 3 benefits

$14,938
$10,177
Total
$12,638
$16,889
SOURCE: Estimates provided by staff of Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy
Evaluation and Research, U.S. Department of Labor.
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The estimates are for the year 1980 with the average
(total) unemployment rate assumed at four different
levels:
a. 5.5 percent
b. 6.6 percent
c. 7.5 percent
d. 8.5 percent
7. Estimates of extended benefits as provided under ex
isting programs are based on the estimated triggering
of EB on and off, by state and nationally, throughout
the year. EB is estimated payable under each assumed
unemployment rate on a calendar quarter rather than
weekly basis. The national EB program is estimated
to trigger on only under the assumed 8.5 percent rate,
and remains on throughout the year. Under each of
the other assumed rates, the number of states trig
gered on, by number of quarters, are as follows:

6.

Unemployment Total
on
rate
5.5
6.6
7.5

Four
Three
Two
One
quarter quarters quarters quarters

32010
2
0
1
8
11
5
2
11
9
27

The estimates in table 3 show that total benefits paid out
by the three-tier program would exceed total outlays of the
existing regular and EB programs under three of the assumed
unemployment rates, and would be less only under the 8.5
percent rate. Total outlays compare as follows:

Existing programs
Three-tier program

Assumed unemployment rates
8.5
7.5
5.5
6.6
(billions)
$17.2
$14.2
$ 9.2
$11.4
16.9
14.9
10.2
12.6

Most of the difference arises from EB outlays compared with
tier 3 outlays. The latter exceed total EB payments at all
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assumed unemployment levels, although by only $82 million
at the 8.5 percent rate. At lower assumed unemployment
levels, the difference is over $1 billion in each case. It is in
teresting to note that regular UI program outlays total about
$200 million to $300 million more than tier 1 and tier 2
benefits combined at each unemployment level. The effect,
then, of the three-tier approach is some shifting of benefits
to better attached and longer term unemployed workers.
The pattern indicated by these cost estimates seems clear.
At lower levels of unemployment, the three-tier program
would pay out more in benefits than the present system. As
unemployment rises, and extended benefits become increas
ingly widespread, the difference narrows. At some point,
outlays under the present UI system would exceed three-tier
outlays.
Another observation worth noting here is that tier 1 ac
counts for well over half the estimated total benefit costs of
the three-tier program. The range is from 57 to 62
percent the lower the rate of unemployment, the higher the
proportion. Tier 3 accounts for 12 to 15 percent of total
costs, rising with increased unemployment. Considering tiers
1 and 2 only, as some approximation of the regular UI pro
gram, tier 1 costs range from 67 to 71 percent of the two
tiers, indicating how much UI costs concentrate in the first
13 weeks of unemployment.
Somewhat fewer unemployed workers would qualify for
tier 1 benefits than for regular benefits under January 1980
provisions. For states with flat annual earnings re
quirements, such as California, the 14-weeks test for tier 1
would be more restrictive. In some other states, the 14-weeks
requirement would qualify more than would the current test,
such as 20 weeks in New York. The base-period total earn
ings test applied for tier 1, however, may be stiffer than earn
ings required by the existing provision, thereby offsetting
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some of this difference. On balance, the tier 1 test appears to
be more demanding overall. Under the proposed three-tier
programs described above, states would be free to set the tier
1 requirement anywhere from 14 to 20 weeks. To the extent
they are set closer to 20 weeks, fewer claimants would
qualify for tier 1.
Under the regular UI program, the exhaustion rate rises
with the level of unemployment. Based on table 3 estimates,
these rates follow the expected pattern ranging from about
18 percent under the 5.5 percent unemployment rate to 26
percent under the 8.5 percent rate (table 4). 21 Comparable
exhaustion rates under the three-tier system are not quite as
clear-cut. Appropriate comparisons are with exhaustees of
tier 2 plus tier 1 exhaustees who did not draw any tier 2
payments, presumably because they could not qualify,
although a few may have returned to work at that point. Ad
ding the two together, the exhaustees of the first two tiers
represent exhaustion rates running about one percentage
point more than the rates under the regular program, at all
four assumed unemployment levels. Tier 1 exhaustees who
did not go on to tier 2 were only about 10 percent of the total
exhausting tiers 1 or 2, but enough to account for the higher
rate as compared with the regular program. These claimants
draw for 13 weeks but do not meet the 26-weeks work test of
tier 2; many would draw additional weeks under the regular
program in some states and return to work before ex
hausting. On the other hand, many regular benefit ex
haustees who draw more than 13 but less than 26 weeks of
benefits would qualify for tier 2 and be eligible for 26 weeks
21. Exhaustion rates as used in this analysis are lower than what they would be if they could
be calculated the usual way whereby the total of exhaustees for a 12-month period is taken
as a percent of first payments totaled for a 12-month period ending 6 months earlier. With
the lag in the periods of the two totals not possible with the data developed for the
estimates first payments would be lower for the lagged period than for the period of the
exhaustee count (much lower as unemployment rises) and the exhaustion rates therefore
would be higher.
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Table 4
Comparison of Estimated Exhaustion Rates Under Regular, EB, and
Three-Tier UI Programs, 1980_______________________
Program

Exhaustion rates1
Assumed unemployment rates of:
5.5 percent 6.6 percent 7.5 percent 8.5 percent

Regular program
Tiers 1 and 22

18.4%
19.5

21.5%
23.0

24.1%
25.1

25.6%
27.0

EB program
Tier 3

60.6
48.0

60.5
51.3

62.2
53.8

60.1
51.8

Regular and EB programs
Three-tier program

18.2
10.4

20.4
12.9

19.5
14.6

15.6
15.3

SOURCE: Table 3 data.
1. Estimated number of exhaustions in 1980 as a percent of first payments in 1980; these
rates understate the more accurate rates based on first payments in year ending 6 months
earlier.
2. Includes tier 1 exhaustees who did not draw tier 2 benefits.

of benefits in all. Some might, therefore, be carried long
enough so that they return to work before exhausting tier 2.
These offsetting effects seem to balance out in a way leading
to a higher exhaustion rate under tiers 1 and 2 than under the
regular program. The rates under the two programs are
close, however, possibly within the range of estimating er
rors.
The tier 3 exhaustion rate ranges between 48 and 54 per
cent of those receiving tier 3 payments. 22 The EB exhaustion
rate runs about 60-62 percent at all assumed unemployment
levels. The uniform 13-week addition of tier 3 appears to
cover the need for longer protection more adequately than
does the largely variable EB addition.
22. With the 26 weeks-of-work test applied for tier 3, the assumption is that all tier 2 ex
haustees go on to draw tier 3. Some actually would not because the tier 3 test (39 weeks of
work or the alternative) would screen them out, but probably not enough to make any im
portant difference in these comparisons.
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These estimates, then, indicate that, compared with
regular benefits, the three-tier program would qualify
somewhat fewer claimants for benefits, but a slightly higher
proportion of claimants paid may exhaust their entitlement
under tiers 1 and 2 than do regular UI claimants. Adding tier
3, however, reduces the total program exhaustion rate con
siderably, ranging from 10 to 15 percent, depending on the
level of unemployment. Adding EB to the regular program
in the periods payable results in final regular-EB exhaustion
rates that run a good deal higher than the three-tier exhaus
tion rates until unemployment is high enough to trigger on
EB nationally year-round. At that point, the two exhaustion
rates are about the same.

VI. UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE
The proposed Job Security System includes a new
unemployment assistance program as a major backstop to
UI. UA would be available to unemployed workers from
low-income households who do not receive UI. These in
clude jobless workers who are not covered by UI, do not
meet the UI qualifying requirements, or who have exhausted
UI. UA would be a federal program financed by general
revenues but administered by state job security agencies.
As proposed, the new program would replace the
federally-subsidized state AFDC programs and state or local
general assistance insofar as these programs now provide
support to unemployed workers. Eligible UA claimants
would report their employment and job search status on a
weekly basis and receive payments for weeks of unemploy
ment. They would be subject to treatment and monitoring
similar to UI claimants with regard to job search assistance,
counseling, and continuing eligibility.

Justification for UA
Several considerations enter into the rationale for a new
federal UA program. One is the desirability of treating
unemployed workers who need income support primarily as
jobseekers rather than as welfare cases. For the past 20
years, welfare program amendments and reform proposals
have laid increasing stress, through incentives and re103
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quirements, on moving adult recipients into labor force ac
tivity aimed at making them more or entirely selfsupporting. With certain exceptions, adult recipients of
AFDC must register at the employment service and be
available for placement in jobs, training programs, or sub
sidized public employment. The WIN program is designed
specifically to help move these individuals into such activity.'
Still, their cash support continues to come from the same
program supporting persons who are not required to be
available for work or training, such as mothers of children
under school age and those caring for sick or disabled family
members. This mixture of cases that emphasize work orien
tation with cases that do not tends to blur the emphasis. Re
cent welfare reform proposals continue to lump together the
work- and nonwork-oriented with respect to cash assistance.
A UA program for the former would carry to a more logical
footing the policy of moving capable welfare recipients from
welfare to work.
Under the proposed UA program, recipients would claim
their cash assistance on a weekly basis. The basis of the claim
and the payment would relate to employment rather than
welfare circumstances. With some frequency, recipients
would receive close counseling concerning employment
possibilities, job search, training, and other types of ad
justments or actions to improve their vocational capabilities.
They would thereby be encouraged to see themselves chiefly
as jobseekers and not mainly as welfare cases, and to apply
themselves accordingly. The same view of them by ad
ministrative staff would also contribute to the emphasis on
work orientation.
As proposed, UA would also embrace low-income
unemployed workers who are not supported by present
1. The WIN (Work Incentive) program has operated since 1968; for a recent account of
that program's operations, see Employment and Training Report of the President, 1980,
pp. 50-54.
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welfare programs. AFDC is confined to households with
dependent children and, in about half the states, to singleparent households. State and local general assistance is
unevenly available or very restrictive. Various welfare
reform proposals have aimed at including in AFDC all twoparent families and unemployed persons without children
(childless couples and, less often, single individuals), but
with no success to date.
UA, financed fully from federal funds, would relieve the
states of some of the current financial burdens of welfare,
another aim of reform proposals. These burdens fall uneven
ly on the states and reflect uneven levels of support and treat
ment.
Another consideration in support of UA is the need to
place limits on the employer-financed UI program. The
reasoning for a 39-week limitation for UI was discussed
earlier. Besides the duration limit, the application of increas
ingly stiff qualifying requirements, tier by tier, while
desirable for insurance benefits based on rights earned
through employment, would screen out some marginal
workers. UA would apply less stringent work qualifying re
quirements, and would give credit for the time spent in voca
tional training and education or for other evidence of labor
force activity. The sentiment for maintaining low UI qualify
ing requirements or for extending UI benefit duration for ex
tremely long periods is understandable when no adequate,
alternative income support exists for workers with limited
past employment or very long term unemployment problems
who need support. Stretching UI to cover these needs
weakens that program's insurance character and is more
costly than confining such support to low-income cases.

Eligibility Requirements
To qualify for UA, unemployed workers would have to
meet a household income test and tests of past and current
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labor force attachment. The present AFDC program does
not apply a prior work requirement, except for unemployed
fathers where states have adopted this added segment of
AFDC. To be eligible for AFDC, the unemployed father in
the household must have qualified for UI during the past
year, or worked in at least 6 of the last 13 calendar quarters.
AFDC means tests place limitations on household income
and assets. 2 No prior work test applies for general assistance;
a means test is the principal eligibility rule.

Income Test for UA
The measurement of "need" proposed for UA eligibility is
less limiting than present welfare tests. Only income would
be a factor; assets would not be considered. Moreover, UA is
not intended to be limited to unemployed workers whose
families have been reduced to poverty; the income test's ob
jective aims instead at excluding those from households
where income continues at a reasonable level despite the
claimant's unemployment. By and large, eligible UA
claimants would be from families with no other working
members, or with working members who contribute relative
ly little to the financial support of their households. This
concept for the income test would distinguish UA from the
usual welfare identification with poverty; UA would occupy
a middle position between welfare and UI.
The approach recommended for the income test links to
the lower living standard budget developed and estimated
annually by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 3 A similar
2. While AFDC has no income test as such, income received is offset against the amount of
the AFDC payment; the offset for wage income is restricted to two-thirds of the amount
earned less a disregard of $30; other income is offset fully.
3. BLS has developed three levels of an annual urban family budget representing a
"lower," "intermediate," and "higher" standard of living for a four-person family of a
particular composition (a working man, his nonworking wife, and two school-age
children). Each autumn, BLS prices or updates the costs of these budgets and publishes
results some months later for selected metropolitan areas and the U.S. See BLS Bulletin
No. 1570-05, "Three Standards of Living for an Urban Family of Four Persons" (Spring
1967), U.S. Department of Labor.
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approach is taken as the basis of income eligibility for CETA
services. The lower level budget represents a "belownormal" standard to which a family may be reduced because
of a temporary loss of income. It is not a "minimal" or
poverty-level standard.
For example, the U.S. lower level budget estimate for an
urban, four-person family as of autumn 1979 was $12,585. 4
The total included $10,234 for consumption expenditures
and $2,351 for income taxes, social security contributions,
and other nonconsumption items. The 1979 poverty
threshold for a nonfarm family of four persons was $7,412. 5
These estimates can be adjusted for different family sizes.
Claimants filing for UA following the date when budget data
become available would have to meet a household income
test based on this lower level budget estimate. The test ap
plied could require that the household income during the
prior 12 months (or during the past 6 or 3 months and annualized) not exceed the appropriate total budget level or, if
a more stringent test is desired, the total of consumption
costs within that budget. The household income test should
be applied periodically (after 3 or 6 months) to take account
of changes in income or family size.
Some geographic or urban-rural variation may be
desirable for the household income test. Since the UA weekly
amount payable is wage-related, either directly or through a
relationship to a UI weekly amount (see below) based on
state provisions, state income tests that reflect cost-of-living

4. "Autumn 1979 Urban Family Budgets and Comparative Indexes for Selected Urban
Areas," News, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Washington, DC,
April 30, 1980.
5. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 125, Money
Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the United States: 1979 (Advance
Report), U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1980.
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variations among states may be appropriate. There are
various possibilities for "fine-tuning" an income test. 6

Prior work requirements
The UA claimant must also give evidence of recent labor
force attachment. The objective is to make UA broader in
scope than UI so that it would admit workers who are not
covered by UI or not able to meet the UI qualifying re
quirements. The following requirements are proposed for
UA to allow a wider gate, yet also to keep some reasonable
basis for assuring attachment. The suggestions are tentative,
since there is little experience with their adequacy for the
purpose.
To qualify, the claimant must meet one of the following
tests:
1. Drew UI during the last year.
2. Worked at least 14 weeks during the last year, with
earnings each week equal to at least 15 percent of the
statewide average weekly covered wage. 7
3. Worked at least 10 weeks during the last year with the
same minimum weekly earnings as above, and
registered at least 8 weeks at the employment service
(ES). As an alternative, required ES registration can
be equal to 2 weeks for each week the claimant is
short of the 14-weeks employment requirement.
4. Attended at least 26 weeks during the last year at a
senior high school or institution of higher education,
6. The CETA program issues each year a set of income eligibility standards varying by
family size, by county, and by metropolitan or non-metropolitan area. See "Labor Depart
ment Revises Income Levels Used for CETA Eligibility," News, U.S. Department of
Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Washington, DC, June 2, 1980.
7. This compares with the 20 or 25 percent weekly minimum proposed earlier for the UI
qualifying requirement.
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or in a technical or vocational training program, pro
vided that the education or training was completed
satisfactorily.
The first requirement, of course, admits UI exhaustees
from any tier. The second admits claimants who fail to meet
the more stringent UI requirements. It also qualifies workers
whose employment is not now covered by UI, mainly
workers with employment on small farms or in domestic
household service.
The third requirement is an attempt to bring in claimants
with even less prior employment than 14 weeks but with the
work shortfall made up by ES registration. Other alter
natives could be designed involving even fewer weeks of
work or more weeks of registration. Some current state UI
requirements, especially when based on flat annual earnings,
do admit workers to UI with less than 14 weeks of work.
Having UA available for at least some of these where low in
come is a problem would ease the impact of stiffening the UI
requirement.
The fourth requirement aims at new entrants and reen
trants, particularly young people. Here, too, alternative
designs could vary the number of weeks required or add a
period of ES registration after school completion. The re
quirement for satisfactory completion of school or training
is intended to induce students and trainees to stay with their
work and not drop out. Many youngsters do work on jobs
while in school, either part time or during summer or holiday
periods. They may be able to meet the second or third re
quirements, or even qualify for UI, without completing
school.
Persons who have not worked before, or have not worked
for a year or more, and have not had schooling or training
recently, would not be eligible for UA. This category may in
clude some of the current adult recipients of AFDC. Many
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welfare mothers do have some employment, perhaps
sporadic or unstable in nature, but sometimes enough to
meet the second or third requirement. Lacking that, those
who want employment or are required to be available for
work in order to receive cash support should be steered into
training or helped to obtain some kind of work to establish
at least a foothold in the labor force.

Other requirements and disqualifications
UA recipients would have to be able to work, to be
available for work, and to actively seek work. They would
have to be available for full-time employment. Some recip
ients may have problems regarding reliable child care; such
problems would be good cause for temporary nonavailability
and would not be reasons for suspending UA. Claimants
would be excused from the availability and job search re
quirements while in approved training.
Disqualifications for UA would be for the same reasons
that apply for UI. UA payments would be suspended 13
weeks for voluntary leaving of work or training without
good cause and for misconduct discharges. Refusal of a
suitable job or training opportunity also would result in a
13-week suspension. As with UI, what constitutes "suitable"
work or training would be determined on an individual basis,
taking account of the claimant's prior work experience,
training, education, and capabilities, as well as the duration
of unemployment and current labor market conditions. In
general, UA claimants could be required to reduce their joblevel and wage expectations more and sooner than UI recip
ients.
Benefit reviewers and job search counselors would meet
periodically with UA claimants to encourage and guide their
job search, to consider training possibilities or other types of
vocational adjustments, and to assure that claimants are
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available and seeking work. If some nonwork-connected
problem arises that interferes with the job search or training,
the UA claimant would be referred to an appropriate service
or agency for assistance. No UA benefit suspension would be
imposed for interruption of availability, training, or job
search under such circumstances if there is good cause for
the interruption, if the claimant is taking reasonable steps to
overcome the problem, and if the interruption does not last
beyond a limited period of time, such as four weeks or less,
depending on the nature of the problem. Temporary illness
or disability would not cause UA suspension if not expected
to last more than a few weeks; if longer, the claimant should
file for Supplementary Security Income administered by the
Social Security Administration for disabled needy persons.
UA claimants waiting to qualify through a combination of
work and employment service registration must be available
for work and seeking work during the registration period.
They should be required to report at least once during this
time to consult with a UA reviewer and a jobsearch
counselor concerning their activity and status. Failure to
report, without good cause, would result in the loss of credit
for weeks registered up to that point.

Weekly Amount of UA
As with UI, the weekly UA amount payable would be
related to the claimant's recent prior earnings, if such earn
ings experience exists. This approach is another means of
focusing on the recipient as a worker rather than as a welfare
case. Although UA would be a federal program, the UA
amounts payable would be set to reflect interstate variations
in wages as well. The recommended approach is to have the
weekly UA amounts relate to the UI WBAs.
For eligible claimants who have exhausted UI, the pro
posal is to set the UA weekly amount equal to 90 percent of
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the UI benefit. For claimants who have not received UI but
qualify for UA with at least 14 weeks of work, the weekly
amount would equal 90 percent of what the UI WBA would
have been if based on earnings in that employment. The UA
amount is set 10 percent lower than the UI level to increase
incentives to take lower paying jobs.
The main problem in assigning UA amounts would arise
for claimants with very little or no recent employment. These
include new entrants and reentrants to the labor market, and
marginal or very irregular workers. Youngsters who have
recently completed their schooling and AFDC mothers are
prominent among them. Many of these individuals may have
worked to some extent, part time or for brief periods, while
in school or when child-care arrangements could be made.
Those with at least 10 weeks of employment in the past year
would qualify for UA after having registered at the ES for a
required period. The UA amount could be based on average
earnings during the weeks worked. It would be wise,
however, to consider whether or not that average is a
distorted representation of the claimant's normal earning
capacity. Concentrated work in short periods involving
much overtime can lead to an unrepresentative weekly
average. The same is true where the employment consisted of
very limited part-time work. One approach would be to
calculate a weekly earning capacity based on the hourly rate
earned, excluding overtime, multiplied by a specified
number of hours per week.
For those with no recent employment, or less than 10
weeks of work, but who qualify on the basis of completed
education or training, the problem is more difficult. If it is
clear that the training or education could qualify the in
dividual for a particular type of job, then the locally prevail
ing entry wage for that job could be used as the basis for the
UA amount. If not, the federal or state statutory minimum
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hourly wage could be used to develop a weekly wage base for
the UA amount.
The most difficult problem comes with the individual who
currently receives AFDC. AFDC recipients who have had
some employment during the past year would be able to
qualify for UA, or might even qualify for UI. The weekly
UA (or UI) amount payable, however, may be less than the
cash support (prorated weekly) provided by AFDC. The
AFDC amount is not related to wage experience but is, in
stead, more closely related to a minimal living standard con
cept, or some proportion of a minimal level, taking account
of the number of dependent children, housing cir
cumstances, etc. AFDC amounts provided by the states vary
widely. In May 1980, for example, the average monthly
AFDC payment per family ranged among the states from
$87 to $384. The U.S. average payment was $271.8 The
AFDC payment thus could and often would exceed the in
come provided by UA or UI, especially for larger families.
AFDC recipients who qualify for UI currently may choose
whichever program they wish to use; they are not likely to
choose the one yielding a lower level of support. Even when
UI exceeds the AFDC cash support level, recipients may still
prefer AFDC since it entitles them to Medicaid and housing
supplements not available to UI claimants. If the UA
amount is substantially less than AFDC, it would be hard to
justify a policy that abruptly eliminates AFDC for persons
who can work and could qualify for UA.
There appears to be no easy solution to this dilemma. One
possibility is a gradual phaseout of AFDC for such persons.
Over a period of time, the AFDC support they are paid could
be reduced by small amounts until UA (or UI) becomes more
attractive. Recent reform proposals did call for a lower cash
8. Public Assistance Payments, May 1980, U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser
vices, Social Security Administration, December 1980, p. 10.
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support level for families containing adults required to be
available for work. Another possibility is to add dependent
children's allowances to the basic UA amount, but in states
which do not add allowances to UI, the UA-UI relationship
would become distorted. Another would be to allow families
on AFDC to continue to receive the children's portion as a
supplement to UA (or UI) to the extent needed to make up
the difference. Eligibility for Medicaid and housing subsidies
could also continue. Some transition approach can be devis
ed with some protection against a sudden severe decline in
the level of support in individual cases.
Although UA recipients must be available for full-time
work, a partial UA amount would be provided when the
claimant takes a part-time job as a temporary expedient and
earns an amount per week equal to less than about 1.6 times
the weekly UA amount. The full UA amount would be
reduced by two-thirds of the amount earned, less a disregard
of 15 percent of earnings.
UA Duration
As long as the UA recipient actively seeks work and meets
all other requirements with respect to job search and
counseling advice, UA would continue to be payable. No
specific limit is set on its duration. Except for periods of
severe and prolonged recession, it is difficult to conceive of a
UA recipient being unable to obtain some kind of employ
ment for at least 14 weeks in a year's time. Continued
failure, however, to find employment or to benefit from
training or some other remedial assistance would have to be
construed as evidence that the recipient is not employable.
After a year, unless some special circumstances justify con
tinued UA in such cases, the recipient could be judged no
longer eligible. Application for SSI as a disabled individual
might be indicated.
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Administration of UA

Although UA is designed as a federal program financed by
federal general revenues, the states would administer UA as
part of the proposed Job Security System. Its close
resemblance to UI and the important application of employ
ment services and job search assistance make the state agen
cy the logical selection for UA administration. A separate
operation would defeat the objective of treating UA
claimants primarily as jobseekers.
Some UI administrators may seriously object to state
agency acceptance of responsibility for UA. They may feel it
would weaken or dilute efforts to maintain a high-quality UI
operation. Other special programs of cash support for
unemployed workers have been assigned to them over the
years, often with inadequate administrative resources. That
is a legitimate cause for resistance to added responsibilities.
Without sufficient and well-trained staff and satisfactory
support in general, UA cannot expect to achieve its objec
tives.
Another objection concerns the mix of the insurance and
welfare concepts within the same overall administrative
system. The application of an income test for UA carries the
possible connotation of "inferior" status vis a vis UI. The
fear is that the stigma may "rub off" on UI and that both
administrative staff and the public may degrade their treat
ment and view of UI claimants and weaken the social in
surance traditions that have helped maintain the dignity of
the UI program. This, too, is a legitimate concern. The
response is that, compared with the existing welfare ap
proach for employable persons, the proposed UA program
goes far to escape welfare connotations. The income test is
not poverty oriented, and there is no investigation of
household assets. As it is with UI, the emphasis is on
employment, not need. If handled properly, there need not
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be any loss of status or dignity by UI claimants, and UA reci
pients can achieve a more favorable position than is the case
when dependent on AFDC or general assistance. Much
would depend on how aggressively and successfully the agen
cy presses the objective of employment equally for both UI
and UA.

Potential Cost and Impact of UA
No estimates for UA costs are available. Certainly, UA
would add a new dimension and a new set of costs. To some
extent, offsetting cost savings would be realized, as UA
would replace other forms of support in many instances. The
tendency to extend UI duration during recession through
federal supplemental benefits has become well established.
With UA, such extension may be less likely to occur. Because
of the income test and lower weekly amount for UA, less
would be paid out in UA to exhaustees than in supplemental
UI benefits for the period FSB would be payable. A study of
exhaustees of regular UI and EB who drew FSB in 1975-1977
found that about 30 percent were from households with
money income equal to at least twice the official poverty
level; the household incomes of another 14 percent were be
tween 1.5 and 2.0 times the poverty level. 9 Assuming applica
tion of the proposed UA income test, this finding implies
that almost 45 percent of all UI exhaustees under the threetier program potentially eligible for FSB during recession
periods would not qualify for UA. 10
Where AFDC and General Assistance recipients shift to
UA, offsetting cost savings would occur. For the same in9. Walter Corson and Walter Nicholson, The Federal Supplemental Benefits Program—An
Appraisal of Emergency Extended Unemployment Insurance Benefits (Kalamazoo, MI:
The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, forthcoming 1981).
10. Using 1979 figures cited earlier for four-person families, the lower level budget was
about 1.7 times the poverty threshold.
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dividuals, however, it is difficult to tell if the net effect
overall would be higher or lower costs.
UA would go to other workers who are not now supported
by existing programs. Besides UI exhaustees who meet the
income test, unemployed workers unable to qualify for UI
because of limited employment might be able to qualify for
UA. To the extent that states raise their UI qualifying re
quirements because of UA, there would be offsetting cost
savings in UI. Jobseekers, especially youths, who qualify for
UA on the basis of completed education or training would
add a new element of cost.
Because UA is not strictly limited in duration, there may
be concern about the potential costliness of such a more or
less open-ended program. Moreover, the indefinite
availability of UA may lower incentives to seek and take
jobs. There is, of course, no duration limit on the current
AFDC programs either. With an aggressive pursuit of job
search and vocational adjustment, pressed by JSS staff, the
expectation is that continued dependence on UA would not
be indefinite. Those efforts would also help offset disincen
tive effects of UA, as would the lower rate of wage-loss com
pensation as compared with UI rates. In some cases, UA
recipients who fail to find employment may be judged
unemployable and removed from the UA program. They
may qualify for cash support under the Supplemental Securi
ty Income program for aged and disabled persons who are
unable to work.
Estimates of UA costs require data describing potential
recipients by household size and income, work and earnings
experience, and education or training experience. For some
groups, part but not all of the information may be available
by which to estimate who could qualify for UA. Eligibility of
UI exhaustees and current AFDC recipients may be easiest to
estimate, although the principal difficulty would be lack of
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household income information for UI exhaustees and work
experience information for AFDC recipients. For other
potential clients, the data available is even less solid. Apart
from eligibility, estimates of claimant duration of UA are
also quite problematical because of the lack of information
about very long term unemployment experienced by lowincome households as well as the potential effects of ag
gressive, assisted job search efforts. Some claimants, no
doubt, would move in and out of employment and float be
tween UA and UI, a difficult pattern to estimate.
While some estimates of UA costs can be made and should
be pursued, their reliability may be limited or uncertain. One
way to overcome the problem is to establish UA on an ex
perimental basis in a state or two, or in a few areas, and gain
some experience. Another is to begin UA slowly by making it
available to one or two categories of potential recipients at
first and expanding its coverage gradually. UI exhaustees,
for example, may be the first candidates for UA, followed by
workers not covered by AFDC, and then AFDC recipients.
This order would place first emphasis on unemployed
workers who have no other source of cash support.

VII. SUMMARY AND
CONCLUSIONS
Summary
Reemployment is the primary objective of the proposed
Job Security System. Its various programs are all designed to
support that goal. Workers who lose their jobs or experience
temporary layoff could turn to the JSS for job search
assistance, other reemployment services, and partial wageloss replacement through unemployment insurance or
unemployment assistance. Under normal labor market con
ditions, most of the unemployed would return to work in a
relatively short period, usually within two or three months.
When jobless workers initially file for benefits or apply for
employment services, the system's first procedure would be
to identify those who may face difficulty in regaining
employment. The system would continue to work with
claimants or applicants so identified through diagnosis of
their problems, through periodic counseling to guide their
job search, and by arranging for retraining or other kinds of
adjustments that may enhance their employability. The
Employment Service component of the JSS would have the
principal responsibility for these functions but would work
closely with UI and UA staff in servicing individual workers
drawing income support. Matching jobseekers and job open
ings in good volume and across a broad range of occupations
would strengthen the labor exchange function of the ES and
119
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the assistance it can provide to the unemployed and to
employers in local labor markets. The ES would also be the
center for labor market information. The better its detailed
knowledge of current local employment conditions and the
better its methods to make that knowledge directly useful to
jobseekers and employers, the better its contribution to
reduced unemployment and the effective use of labor
resources.
Although existing state Employment Services (or Job Ser
vices) perform all of these functions to one degree or
another, most are not doing so comprehensively or
systematically, particularly with regard to workers with
established labor force attachment the experienced
unemployed. Restriction of administrative resources over the
last 15 years has limited ES capacity to serve adequately a
greatly expanded labor force. ES activities have been increas
ingly diverted from mainstream goals to service special pro
grams, such as registering welfare and food stamp recipients
for work test purposes but with little or no genuine follow
through, operating the employment and training aspects of
the WIN program for adult AFDC recipients, and dealing
with a variety of needs of the GETA programs. Funds
allocated to cover the added costs of these activities have not
been adequate. As a result, the ES has played a diminishing
role in helping experienced unemployed workers regain
employment. Past efforts to disassociate the ES from the UI
program to improve the former's image and stature as a
manpower agency only added further to that result. The pro
posed JSS calls for a reorientation of the ES to reemphasize
the job search needs of experienced workers and a
strengthening of its capacity to serve those needs.
Under the proposed system, the UI program would be
restructured to support more strongly the reemployment
goal. States would still specify the statutory details of UI and
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continue to administer the program. The federal role,
however, would be expanded through the application of ad
ditional minimum standards or requirements and through in
creased federal financing of benefits. The new program's
scope of protection would not extend beyond 39 weeks of
benefits in a single year. UI would be organized into 3 suc
cessive tiers, each providing 13 weeks of benefits. In succes
sion, the three tiers would provide compensation for short,
medium, and long term unemployment. Including the long
term tier, all tiers would be available at all times, without
regard to variations in the level of unemployment. Claimants
would have to meet increasingly stiff tests of past work at
tachment as they move from one tier to the next. The tests
would require at least 14 to 20 weeks of work in the past year
to qualify for tier 1 benefits, 26 weeks of work for tier 2, and
39 weeks of work (or 52 weeks during the last 2 years) to
qualify for tier 3. The requirements governing the claimant's
current availability for work and job search would also grow
stricter as unemployment lengthens. UI claimants would be
pressed to consider a broader range of job alternatives and
lower wage levels as they move from tier to tier. Local labor
market conditions would affect the intensity of the job
search efforts expected of claimants. The distinct and formal
procedure of moving from one tier to the next would not on
ly emphasize the stiffer requirements, it would also require a
reassessment of reemployment prospects and job search
strategy. The process is meant to impress upon the claimant
and staff the need for a more urgent attitude about the prob
lem and for a willingness to consider other, perhaps less at
tractive, steps to regain employment. Failure by the claimant
to respond reasonably to advice offered could lead to benefit
suspension.
States would finance all benefit costs of tier 1 through
their own experience-rated UI taxes. State and federal UI tax
revenues would finance equally the benefit costs of tier 2,
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while tier 3 costs would be covered entirely by federal UI
taxes. This arrangement views the UI costs of short term
unemployment as the responsibility of individual employers
and appropriately allocates costs to them through
experience-rated taxes. Individual employer responsibility
for UI costs becomes less supportable as unemployment
lengthens. The general condition of the labor market,
changes in national and international consumer markets,
foreign competition, federal policies, and other factors that
exert their influence without regard to state lines are deemed
more likely to account for longer term unemployment than
factors that operate within states or that individual
employers can control. More pooling, among employers and
on a national basis, of the UI costs of longer term unemploy
ment is therefore considered justifiable and a reasonable ra
tionale for the new financing arrangements. These ar
rangements would also ease the solvency problems of state
UI funds. Federal financing of longer term benefit costs, in
effect, reinsures the state funds against very high and un
predictable recession costs without establishing a special
reinsurance scheme for the purpose.
Under the proposed program, federal minimum standards
would apply to state weekly benefit amount provisions to
reduce the present uneven treatment around the country of
UI claimants with the same wage experience. The standards
would require compensation of at least half the claimant's
weekly wage loss up to a maximum amount that is not less
than two-thirds of the statewide average weekly wage in
covered employment. Revised partial benefit provisions
would offer more incentives than do present provisions for
claimants to take temporary part-time work. They would en
courage and accommodate work sharing as an alternative to
full layoffs.
Estimates indicate that the total benefit costs of the threetier UI program would exceed the costs of the current pro-
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gram of regular and extended benefits, especially when
unemployment rates are low. The difference would diminish
as these rates increase and disappear at high rates of
unemployment. Estimates also show that tier 1 costs would
account for about 60 percent of all benefits under the three
tiers.
With a 39-week limit, the UI program's integrity as a
social insurance program would be better preserved than has
been the case during the recessions of the 1970s when sup
plemental benefits extended the length of UI protection
beyond that limit. To meet the needs of UI exhaustees and of
other unemployed workers not eligible for UI, the JSS would
provide a new program of Unemployment Assistance. UA
would be payable to unemployed workers who meet both a
past employment test and a household income test. The
former test would be less stringent than that for UI eligibility
and allow for some substitution of registered job search time
or time spent in training for weeks of employment. The sug
gested income test would apply an eligibility threshold
equivalent to the lower level living standard budget estimated
annually by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This level is well
above the official poverty line but still likely to exclude about
45 percent of UI exhaustees from UA eligibility. UA weekly
cash benefits would be wage-related, but lower than UI
benefits.
UA recipients would be subject to the same job search and
counseling review procedures as UI claimants. They would,
however, be confronted with greater pressure to consider or
accept a broader range of employment than that reflective of
prior experience and wage levels. Current recipients of
AFDC, food stamps, and general assistance who are re
quired to be available for work would apply for UA instead.
The remaining welfare programs would then be confined to
nonparticipants in the labor force. With the new program,
employable individuals now on welfare would be treated
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essentially as jobseekers and not as welfare cases. The em
phasis would be on job search, week by week, rather than on
the monthly or semi-monthly welfare check which is needsrelated, not wage-related. Low-income unemployed workers
not now eligible for UI or welfare could also apply for UA.
The new program would be administered for the federal
government by state JSS agencies, with all costs financed by
federal general revenues.

Concluding Observations
The proposed Job Security System represents a substantial
departure from existing arrangements, but it also represents
a return to some of the earlier thinking about how to deal
with the unemployment of workers. A major concern about
unemployment insurance at the outset was with the "moral
hazard'' involved the fear that UI recipients would tend to
malinger, to delay returning to work. One important
safeguard against this risk was a public employment service
with a good labor exchange operation. Indeed, a public ES
was generally regarded as a prerequisite to the establishment
of UI. It was natural that UI and ES were closely linked at
the beginning. The more recent weakened connection be
tween the two may be partly responsible for the revived
public concern about the disincentive effects of UI. 1 The JSS
would restore the strong link. Besides applying the work test,
the ES would be called upon to expand and intensify positive
approaches to assist the job search of the insured
unemployed. All components of the JSS are designed with
the central focus on reemployment in mind. At the same
time, the restructuring of UI for this purpose also aims at
resolving or easing some of the problems that currently face
the program. Similarly, the proposed new UA program, in
1. Recent studies of disincentive effects ignore or discount any offsetting effects of ES ap
plications of the work test to claimants.
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its orientation to labor force participation, seeks to solve
some of the dilemmas encountered by welfare reform ef
forts. If it is agreed that reemployment is the appropriate
central objective of public programs for the unemployed and
that some of the difficulties of these programs can be
diminished in the process of reorganizing them around that
objective, then the JSS approach has much to recommend it.
A major question, however, is whether a strengthened and
revitalized Employment Service with expanded job search
assistance efforts for experienced unemployed workers can
produce significant reemployment results and be cost effec
tive. The added administrative costs will be substantial. Staff
required to apply the more intensive and individualized
treatments will have to be larger and more highly trained.
The direct payoff is in shorter unemployment and reduced
outlays for income support. Indirect benefits include more
productive use of labor resources, increased wage earnings
with multiplier effects on demand, greater tax revenues,
more economic activity in general, and various social gains
from less unemployment. Several limited experiments with
more concentrated services to UI claimants, made about 10
or more years ago, offered some promise that favorable
results can be achieved if such efforts are not inhibited by
very poor labor market conditions. 2
This monograph has presented the JSS proposal with a
considerable amount of specific detail. The purpose is to
make more tangible the ideas underlying the system and the
means for their implementation. Details, of course, can
vary; those suggested do not in themselves constitute a rigid
set of specifications. The broader design features are more
important to the system as a whole. For example, a
strengthened ES refocused to promote the job search and
reemployment of the experienced unemployed is crucial to
2. See footnote 5, ch. IV.

126

Summary & Conclusions

the scheme. Exactly how the services are organized and staff
ed can involve a range of alternatives. The three-tier design
for the UI program is important to its support of the
reemployment objective and to its phased cooperative effort
with the ES as the unemployment of claimants lengthens.
The details of federal rquirements and of financing patterns
need not be identical to those described here, but something
along the lines indicated would help ease the current issues
concerning UI duration limits, benefit inequities and inade
quacies among state provisions, and state UI fund insolven
cy. A new UA program is important to preserve the social in
surance integrity of UI and at the same time meet the needs
of long term unemployed workers from low-income
households who are beyond the duration limits of UI protec
tion. The extent to which UA should be available to other
jobseekers, including those now receiving welfare, is a less
vital question to the total JSS scheme. A broader scope for
UA, however, offers a means of rationalizing the treatment
of work-oriented welfare recipients and other low-income
unemployed. The specific UA eligibility tests and weekly
benefit levels described here are mainly illustrative.
The JSS proposal need not and probably should not be im
plemented all at once. It can serve as a broad plan to be
achieved through a series of steps following a sequence
leading eventually to the total system. A good place to start
is with the employment services. Their strengthening and
systematic application to UI claimants at appropriate stages
of unemployment is the most important aspect of the new
system to develop quickly. It will take time to perfect the
approaches that work best and to shape a staff that can
employ them well. Building on the U.S. Department of
Labor's current Eligibility Review Program may be the way
to proceed, concentrating first in a few states and then ex
panding to others after refinements are made. An ex
perimental UA program could come next, perhaps confined
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at first to UI exhaustees, then including low-income
unemployed not now eligible for welfare, and finally adding
current welfare recipients who are employable. Redesign of
UI may be the most difficult step to take because it involves
considerable reform of existing state programs, and requires
state as well as federal legislation. Federal provision of long
term (tier 3) benefits at all times, applying the additional re
quirements and full federal financing, could be offered first
as a replacement for the existing triggered EB program.
Reassessment of the prospects and job search needs of
claimants before they draw more than 13 weeks of benefits
could also be emphasized, along with increased intensity of
counseling and review services. The most significant results
of the step-by-step process may be the improvements gained
in diagnosing reemployment problems and in learning how
best to tailor services to individual needs. Patterns that
emerge in dealing with the unemployed with respect to the
stages and duration of their unemployment are likely to sug
gest the value and best design for a tiered UI program.
The proposed system provides some new ways to think
about dealing with the problems of unemployment and
welfare. As existing programs age and grow subject to
various degrees of rigidity, the need for fresh viewpoints in
creases. This monograph will serve an important purpose if
it stimulates thinking and debate about these problems along
new lines.

